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FOREWORD 
S MANY of our readers know, the name of the Rice A Institute was changed on July 1, 1960, to William 
Marsh Rice University. At this conclusion of Volume Forty- 
Seven, therefore, the name of this journaI must become The 
Rice Uniuersity Pamphlet. 
Another, more major, change is also in store for The 
Pamphlet. As Rice University has assumed part of the re- 
sponsibility for publication of The Journal of Southern His- 
tory, and this month commences publication of Studies in 
English Literature: 1500-1900, it is no longer possible, or in 
a sense necessary, to continue the quarterly publication of 
The Pamphlet. 
This issue, therefore, closes forty-seven years of what we 
believe to have been a distinguished quarterly publication. 
Volume Forty-Eight of The Rice University Pamplzlet will 
be the first of a series of annual monographs. 
For this reason, this committee has chosen to end Volume 
Forty-Seven with a reissue of one of the most distinguished 
and most famous papers ever published in The Pamphlet, 
one that has for long been out of print, but never super- 
seded: The Breviary of Aesthetic, by Benedetto Croce, 
originally published in December, 1915, as Number Four of 
Volume 11. 
T. N. MARSH, Chairman 
Committee on Publications 

THE BREVIARY OF BSTHETIC1 
'WHAT IS ART?" 
I N reply to the question, ''What is art?", it might be said jocosely (but this would not be a bad joke) that art is 
what everybody knows it to be. And indeed, if it were not 
to some extent known what it is, it would be impossible even 
to ask that question, for eveiy question implies a certain 
knowledge of what is asked about, designated in the ques- 
tion and therefore known and qualified. A proof of this is 
to be found in the fact that we often hear expressed just and 
profound ideas in relation to art by those who make no pro- 
fession of philosophy or of theory, by laymen, by artists 
who do not like to reason, by the ingenuous, and even by the 
common people: these ideas are sometimes implicit in judg- 
ments concerning particular works of art but at others as- 
sume altogether the form of aphorisms and of definitions. 
Thus it happens that there arises the belief in the possibility 
of making blush, at will, any proud philosopher who should 
believe himself to have "discovered" the nature of art, by 
placing before his eyes or making ring in his ears proposi- 
tions talcen from the most superficial books or phrases of the 
most ordinary conversation, and shewing that they already 
most clearly contained his vaunted discovery. 
And in this case the philosopher would have good reason 
to blush-that is, had he ever nourished the illusion of intro- 
ducing into universal human consciousness, by means of his 
l A  lecture prepared for the inauguration of the Rice Institute, by 
Benedetto Croce, Senator of the Kingdom of Italy, Member of several 
Royal Commissions, Editor of "La Critica." Translated from the Italian 
by Douglas Ainslie, B.A. Oxon., of The Athenaeum, London, England. 
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doctrines, something altogether original, something extra- 
neous to this consciousness, the revelation of an altogether 
new world. But he does not blush, and continues upon 
his way, for he is not ignorant that the question as to what 
is art (as indeed every philosophical question as to the nature 
of the real, or in general every question of knowledge), even 
if by its use of language it seem to assume the aspect of a 
general and total problem, which it is claimed to solve for 
the first and last time, has always, as a matter of fact, a cir- 
cumscribed meaning, referable to the particular difficulties 
that assume vitality at a determined moment in the history 
of thought. Certainly, truth does walk the streets, like the 
esprit of the well-known French proverb, or like metaphor, 
I' queen of tropes" according to rhetoricians, which Mon- 
taigne discovered in the babil of his chanzbrikre. But the 
metaphor used by the maid is the solution of a problem of 
expression proper to the feelings that affect the maid at that 
moment; and the obvious affirmations that by accident or in- 
tent one hears every day as to the nature of art, are solu- 
tions of logical problems, as they present themselves to this 
or that individual, who is not a philosopher by profession, 
and yet as man is also to some extent a philosopher. And as 
the maid's metaphor usually expresses but a small and vul- 
gar world of feeling compared with that of the poet, so the 
obvious affirmation of one who is not a philosopher solves a 
problem small by comparison with that which occupies the 
philosopher. The answer as to what is art may appear 
similar in both cases, but is different in both cases owing 
to the different degree of richness of its intimate content; 
because the answer of the philosopher worthy of the name 
has neither more nor less than the task of solving in an 
adequate manner all the problems as to the nature of art that 
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have arisen down to that moment in the course of history; 
whereas that of the layman, since it revolves in a far nar- 
rower space, shews itself to be impotent outside those limits. 
Actual proof of this is also to be found in the force of the 
eternal Socratic method, in the facility with which the 
learned, by pressing home their questions, leave those with- 
out Iearning in open-mouthed confusion, though these had 
nevertheless begun by speaking well; but now finding them- 
selves, in the course of the inquily, in danger of losing what 
small knowleclge they possessed, they have no resource but 
to retire into their shell, declaring that they do not like 
"subtleties." 
The philosopl~er's pride is solely based therefore upon 
the greater intensity of his questions and answers; a pride 
not unaccompanied with modesty-that is, with the con- 
sciousness that if his sphere be wider, or the largest pos- 
sible, at a determined moment, yet it is limited by the history 
of that moment, and cannot pretend to a value of totality, 
or what is called a definite solution. The ulterior life of the 
spirit, renewing and multiplying problems, does not so much 
falsify, as render inadequate preceding solutions, part of 
them falling among the number of those truths that are un- 
derstood, and part needing to be again taken up and inte- 
grated. A system is a house, which, as soon as it has been 
built and decorated, has need of continuous labour, more or 
less energetic, in order to keep it in repair subject as it is to 
the corrosive action of the elements); and at a certain mo- 
ment there is no longer any use in restoring and propping 
up the system, we must demolish and reconstruct it from top 
to bottom. But with this capital difference: that in the work 
of thought, the perpetually new house is perpetually main- 
tained by the old one, which persists in it, almost. by an act 
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of magic. As we know, those superficial or ingenuous souls 
that are ignorant of this magic are terrified at  it; so much so, 
that one of their tiresome refrains against philosophy is that 
it continually undoes its work, and that one philosopher 
contradicts another: as though man did not always make 
and unmake his houses, and as though the architect that fol- 
lows did not always contradict the architect that precedes; 
and as though it were possible to  draw the conclusion from 
his making and unmaking of houses and from this contra- 
diction among architects, that it is useless to make houses! 
The answers of the philosopher, though they have the ad- 
vantage of greater intensity, also carry with them the dan- 
gers of greater error, and are often vitiated by a sort of lack 
of good sense, which has an aristocratic character, in so 
far as it belongs to a superior sphere of culture, and even 
when meriting reproof, is the object not only of disdain and 
derision, but also of secret envy and admiration. This is the 
foundation of the contrast, that many delight to i l l~~s t~a te ,  
between the mental equilibrium of ordinary people and the 
extravagances of philosophers; since, for example, it is clear 
that no nlan of good sense would have said that art is a 
reflexion of the sexual instinct, or that it is something 
nlaleficent and deseives to be banned from well-ordered re- 
publics. These absurdities have, however, been uttered 
by philosophers and even by great philosophers. But 
the innocence of the man of common sense is poverty, the 
innocence of the savage; and though there have often been 
sighs for the life of the savage, and a remedy has been called 
for to rescue good sense from philosophies, it remains a 
fact that the spirit, in its development, courageously affronts 
the dangers of civilisation and the momentary loss of good 
sense. The researches of the philosopher in relation to art 
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must tread the paths of error in order to find the path of 
truth, which does not differ from, but is, those very paths of 
error which contain a clue to the labyrinth. 
The close connection of error and truth arises from the 
fact that a complete and total error is inconceivabIe, and, 
since it is inconceivable, does not exist. E i ~ o r  speaks with 
two voices, one of which affirms the false, but the other 
denies it; it is a colliding of yes and no, which is called con- 
tradiction. Therefore, when we descend from general con- 
siderations to the examination of a theory that has been 
condemned as erroneous in its definite pai+ticulars, we find 
the cure in the theory itself-that is, the true theory, which 
grows out of the soil of error. Thus it happens that those 
very people who claim to reduce art to the sexual instinct, 
in order to demonstrate their thesis have recourse to argu- 
ments and meditations which, instead of uniting, separate 
art from that instinct; or that he who would expel poetry 
from the well-constituted republic, shudders in so doing, and 
himself creates a new and sublime poetry. There have been 
historical periods in which the most cmde and perverted 
doctrines of art have dominated; yet this did not prevent 
the habitual and secure separation of the beautiful from the 
ugly at those periods, nor the very subtle discussion of the 
theme when the abstract theory was forgotten and particular 
cases were studied. Error is always condemned, not by the 
mouth of the judge, but ex ore suo. 
Owing to this close connection with error, the affirmation 
of the truth is always a process of strife, by means of which 
it keeps freeing itself in error from error; whence arises 
another pious but impossible desire, namely, that which de- 
mands that truth should be directly exposed, without discus- 
sion or polemic; that it should be permitted to proceed 
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majestically alone upon its way: as if this stage parade were 
the symbol suited to tiuth, which is thought itself, and, as 
thought, ever active and in labour. Indeed, nobody succeeds 
in exposing a truth, save by criticising the different solutions 
of the problem with which it is connected; and there is no 
philosophical treatise, however weak, no little scholastic 
manual or academic dissertation, which does not collect at 
its beginning or contain in its body a review of opinions, his- 
torically given or ideally possible, which it wishes to oppose 
or to correct. This fact, though frequently realised in a 
capricious and disorderly manner, just expresses the legiti- 
mate desire to pass in review all the solutions that have been 
attempted in history or are possible of achievement in idea 
(that is, at the present moment, though always in history), 
in such a way that the new solution shall include in itself all 
the preceding labour of the human spirit. 
But this demand is a logical demand, and as such intrinsic 
to every true thought and inseparable from it; and we must 
not confound it with a definite literary form of exposi- 
tion, in order that we may not fall into the pedantry for 
which the scholastics of the Middle Ages and the dialec- 
ticians of the scl~ool of Hegel in the nineteenth century be- 
came celebrated, which is very closely connected with 
the formalistic superstition, and represents a belief in the 
marvellous virtue of a certain sort of extrinsic and mechan- 
ical philosophical exposition. We must, in short, understand 
it in a substantial, not in an accidental sense, respecting the 
spirit, not the letter, and proceed with freedom in the ex- 
position of our own thought, according to time, place, and 
person. Thus, in these rapid lectures intended to provide as 
it  were a guide to the right way of thinking out problems of 
art, I shall carefully refrain from narrating (as I have done 
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elsewhere) the whole process of liberation from erroneous 
conceptions of art, mounting upwards from the poorest to 
the richest; and I shall cast far away, not from myself, but 
from my readers, a part of the baggage with which they will 
charge themselves when, prompted thereto by the sight of 
the countiy passed over in our bird's flight, they shall set 
themselves to accomplisl~ more particular voyages in this or 
that part of it, or to cross it again from end to end. 
However, connecting the question which has given occa- 
sion to this indispensable prologue (indispensable for the 
purpose of removing from my discourse every appearance 
of pretentiousness, and also all blemish of inutility)-the 
question as to what is art-I will say at once, in the simplest 
manner, that art is vision or intz~ition. The artist produces 
an image or a phantasm; and he who enjoys art turns his 
gaze upon the point to which the artist has pointed, looks 
through the chink which he has opened, and reproduces that 
image in himself. "Intuition," "vision," "contemplation," 
tt . >Y cc  imagination," "fancy," ccfigurations, representations," 
and so on, are words continually recurring, like synonyms, 
when discoursing upon art, and they all lead the mind to the 
same conceptual sphere which indicates general agreement. 
But this reply, that art is intuition, obtains its force and 
meaning from all that it implicitly denies and from which it 
distinguishes art. What negations are implicit in it? I shall 
indicate the principal, or at least those that are the most 
important for us at this present moment of our culture. 
It  denies, above all, that art is a physical fact: for exam- 
ple, certain determined colours, or relations of colours; 
certain definite forms of bodies; certain definite sounds, 
or relations of sounds; certain phenomena of heat or of eIec- 
tricity-in short, whatsoever be designated as "physical." 
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The inclination toward this error of physicising art is al- 
ready present in ordinary thought, and as children who 
touch the soap-bubble and would wish to touch the rainbow, 
so the human spirit, admiring beautiful things, hastens spon- 
taneously to trace out the reasons for them in external na- 
ture, and proves that it must think, or believes that it 
should think, certain colours beautiful and certain other col- 
ours ugly, certain forms beautiful and certain other forms 
ugly. But this attempt has been carried out intentionally 
and with method on several occasions in the histoiy of 
thought: from the "canons" which the Greek theoreticians 
and artists fixed for the beauty of bodies, through the specu- 
lations as to the geometrical and numerical relations of 
figures and sounds, down to the researches of the zsthe- 
ticians of the nineteenth century (Fechner, for example), 
and to the "communications" presented in our day by the 
inexpert, at philosophical, psychological, and natural science 
congresses, concerning the relations of physical phenomena 
with art. Ancl if it be asked why art cannot be a physical 
fact, we must reply, in the first place, that physical facts do 
not possess reality, and that art, to which so many devote 
their whole lives and which fills all with a divine joy, is 
supremely ~ e a l ;  thus it cannot be a physical fact, which is 
something unreal. This sounds at first paradoxical, for 
nothing seems more solid and secure to the ordinary man 
than the physical world; but we, in the seat of truth, must 
not abstain from the good reason and substitute for it one 
less good, solely because the first should have the appear- 
ance of a lie; and besides, in order to surpass what of 
strange and difficult may be contained in that truth, to be- 
come at home with it, we may take into consideration the 
fact that the demonstration of the  inr reality of the physical 
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world llas not only been proved in an indisputable manner 
and is admitted by all philosophers (who are not crass mate- 
rialists and are not involved in the strident contradictions of 
materialism), but is professed by these same pl~ysicists in the 
spontaneous philosophy which they mingle with their phys- 
ics, when they conceive physical phenomena as products of 
principles that are beyond experience, of atoms or of ether, 
or as the manifestation of an Unknowable: besides, the 
matter itself of the materialists is a supermaterial principIe. 
Thus physical facts reveal themselves, by their internal logic 
and by common consent, not as reality, but as a construction 
of our intellect for the purposes of science. Consequently, 
the question whether art be a physical fact must rationally 
assume this different signification: that is to say, whether 
it be possible to construct a93 physically. And this is cer- 
tainly possible, for we indeed carry it out always, when, 
turning from the sense of a poem and ceasing to enjoy it, 
we set ourselves, for example, to count the words of which 
the poem is con~posed and to divide them into syllables and 
letters; or, disregarding the aesthetic effect of a statue, we 
weigh and measure it: a most useful performance for the 
packers of statues, as is the other for the typographers who 
have to "compose" pages of poetry; but most useless for 
the conten~plator and student of art, to whom it is neither 
useful nor licit to allow himself to be "distracted" from his 
proper object. Thus art is not a physical fact in this second 
sense, either; which amounts to saying that when we propose 
to ourselves to penetrate its nature and mode of action, to 
construct it physically is of no avail. 
Another negation is implied in the definition of art as in- 
tuition: if it be intuition, and intuition is equivalent to theory 
in the original sense of contemplation, art cannot be a utili- 
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tarian act; and since a utilitarian act aims always at obtain- 
ing a pleasure and therefore at keeping off a pain, art, 
considered in its own nature, has nothing to do with the 
useful and with pleasure and pain, as such. I t  will be ad- 
mitted, indeed, without much difficulty, that a pleasure as a 
pleasure, any sort of pleasure, is not of itself artistic; the 
pleasure of a drink of water that slakes thirst, or a walk in 
the open air that stretches our limbs and makes our blood 
circulate more lightly, or the obtaining of a longed-for post 
that settles us in practical life, and so on, is not artistic. 
Finally, the difference between pleasure and art leaps to the 
eyes in the relations that are developed between ourselves 
and works of art, because the figure represented may be dear 
to us and represent the most delightful memories, and at the 
same time the picture may be ugly; or, on the other hand, 
the picture may be beautiful and the figure represented hate- 
ful to our hearts, or the picture itself, which we approve as 
beautiful, may also cause us rage and envy, because it is the 
work of our enemy or rival, for whom it will procure advan- 
tage and on whom it will confer new strength: our practical 
interests, with their relative pleasures and pains, mingle and 
sometimes become confused with art and disturb, but are 
never identified with, our aesthetic interest. At the most it 
will be affirmed, with a view to maintaining more effectively 
the definition of a1-t as the pleasurable, that i t  is not the 
pleasurable in general, but a particular form of the pleasur- 
able. But such a restriction is no longer a defence, it is in- 
deed an abandonment of that thesis; for given that art is a 
particular form of pleasure, its distinctive character would 
be supplied, not by the pleasurable, but by what distinguishes 
that pleasurable from other pleasurables, and it would be 
desirable to turn the attention to that distinctive element- 
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more than pleasurable or different from pleasurable. Never- 
theless, the doctrine that defines art as the pIeasurable has 
a special denomination (hedonistic ~sthet ic) ,  and a long 
and complicated development in the history of aesthetic doc- 
trines: it shewed itself in the Graeco-Roman world, prevailed 
in the eighteenth century, reflowered in the second half of 
the nineteenth, and still enjoys much favour, being especially 
well received by beginners in aesthetic, who are above all 
struck by the fact that art causes pleasure. The life of this 
doctrine has consisted of proposing in turn one or another 
cIass of pleasures, or several classes together (the pleasure 
of the superior senses, the pleasure of play, of consciousness 
of our own strength, of criticism, etc., etc.), or of adding to 
it elements differing from the pleasurable, the useful for 
example (when understood as distinct from the pleasura- 
ble), the satisfaction of cognoscitive and moral wants, and 
the like. And its progress has been caused just by this rest- 
lessness, and by its allowing foreign elements to ferment in 
its bosom, which it introduces through the necessity of some- 
how bringing itself into agreement with the reality of art, 
thus attaining to its dissolution as hedonistic doctrine and to 
the promotion of a new doctrine, or at least to drawing at- 
tention to its necessity. And since every error has its ele- 
ment of truth (and that of the physical doctrine has been 
seen to be the possibility of the physical "construction" of 
art as of any other fact), the hedonistic doctrine has its eter- 
nal element of truth in the placing in relief the hedonistic 
accompaniment, or pleasure, common to the aesthetic activ- 
ity as to every form of spiritual activity, which it has not at 
all been intended to deny in absolutely denying the identifi- 
cation of art with the pleasurable, and in distinguishing it 
from the pleasurable by defining it as intuition. 
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A third negation, effected by means of the theory of art as 
intuition, is that art is a moral act; that is to say, that fonn 
of practical act which, although necessarily uniting with the 
useful and with pleasure and pain, is not immediately utili- 
tarian and hedonistic, and moves in a superior spiritual 
sphere. But the intuition, in so far as it is a theoretic act, is 
opposed to the practical of any sort. And in truth, art, as has 
been remarked from the earliest times, does not arise as an 
act of the will; good will, which constitutes the honest man, 
does not constitute the artist. And since it is not the result of 
an act of will, so it escapes all moral discrimination, not be- 
cause a privilege of exemption is accorded to it, but simply be- 
cause moral discrimination cannot be applied to art. An artistic 
image portrays an act morally praiseworthy or blamewor- 
thy; but this image, as image, is neither morally praisewor- 
thy nor blameworthy. Not only is there no penal code that 
can condemn an image to prison or to death, but no moral 
judgment, uttered by a rational person, can make of it its 
object: we might just as well judge the square moral or the 
triangie immoral as the Francesca of Dante immoral or the 
Cordelia of Shaltespeare moral, for these have a purely ar- 
tistic function, they are like musical notes in the souls of 
Dante and of Shakespeare. Further, the moralistic fheoly 
of art is also represented in the history of  esthetic doctrines, 
though much discredited in the common opinion of our times, 
not only on account of its intrinsic demerit, but also, in some 
measure, owing to the moral demerit of certain tendencies 
of our times, which render possible, owing to psycl~ological 
dislike, that refutation of it which should be made-and 
which we here make-solely lor logical reasons. The end 
attributed to art, of directing the good and inspiring horror 
of evil, of correcting and ameliorating customs, is a deriva- 
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tion of the moralistic doctrine; and so is the demand ad- 
dressed to artists to collaborate in the education of the lower 
classes, in the strengthening of the national or bellicose spirit 
of a people, in the digusion of the ideals of a modest and la- 
borious life; and so on. These are all things that art can- 
not do, any more than geometry, which, however, does not 
lose anything of its importance on account of its inability to 
do this; and one does not see why art should do so, either. 
That it cannot do these things was partially perceived by the 
moralistic zstheticians also; who very readily effected a 
transaction with it, permitting it to provide pleasures that 
were not moral, provided they were not openly dishonest, or 
recommending it to employ to a good end the dominion that, 
owing to its hedonistic power, it possessed over souls, to 
gild the pill, to sprinkle sweetness upon the rim of the glass 
containing the bitter draught-in short, to play the cour- 
tezan (since it could not get rid of its old and inborn habits), 
in the service of holy church or of morality: meyetfix eccle- 
sig. On other occasions they have sought to avail them- 
selves of it for purposes of instruction, since not only virtue 
but also science is a difficult thing, and art could remove this 
dBculty and render pleasant and attractive the entrance 
into the ocean of science-indeed, lead them through it as 
through a garden of Armida, gaily and voluptuously, with- 
out their being conscious of the lofty protection they had 
obtained, or of the crisis of renovation which they were pre- 
paring for themselves. We cannot now refrain from a 
smile when we talk of these theories, but should not forget 
that they were once a serious matter corresponding to a seri- 
ous effort to understand the nature of art and to elevate the 
conception of it; and that among those who believed in it 
(to limit ourselves to Italian literature) were Dante and 
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Tasso, Parini and Alfieri, Manzoni and Mazzini. And the 
moralistic doctrine of art was and is and will be perpetually 
beneficial by its very contradictions; it was and will be an 
effort, however unhappy, to separate art from the merely 
pleasing, with which it is sometimes confused, and to assign 
to it a more worthy post: and it, too, has its tiue side, be- 
cause, if art be beyond morality, the artist is neither this 
side of it nor that, but under its empire, in so far as he 
is a man who cannot withdraw himself from the duties of 
man, and must look upon art itself-art, which is not and 
never will be moral-as a mission to be exercised as a priestly 
office. 
Again (and this is the last and perhaps the most important 
of all the general negations that it suits me to recall in rela- 
tion to this matter), wit11 the definition of art as intuition, 
we deny that it has the character of conceptual knowledge. 
Conceptual knowledge, in its true form, which is the philo- 
sophical, is always realistic, aiming at establishing reality 
against unreality, or at lowering unreality by including it in 
reality as a subordinate moment of reality itself. But in- 
tuition means, precisely, indistinction of reality and unreal- 
ity, the image with its value as mere image, the pure ideality 
of the image; and opposing the intuitive or sensible knowl- 
edge to the conceptual or intelligible, the aesthetic to the 
noetic, it aims at claiming the autonomy of this more simple 
and elementary form of knowledge, wl~icll has been com- 
pared to the dream (the dream, and not the sleep) of the 
theoretic life, in respect to which philosopl~y would be the 
waking. And indeed, whoever should ask, when examining 
a work of art, whether what the artist has expressed be 
metaphysically and historically true or false, asks a question 
that is without meaning, and commits an error analogous to 
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his who should bring the airy images of the fancy before 
the tribunal of morality: without meaning, because the 
discrimination of true and false always concerns an affirma- 
tion of reality, or a judgment, but it cannot fall under the 
head of an image or of a pure subject, which is not the sub- 
ject of a judgment, since it is without qualification or predi- 
cate. I t  is useless to object that the individuality of the 
image cannot subsist without reference to the universal, of 
which that image is the individuation, because we do not 
here deny that the universal, as the spirit of God, is every- 
where and animates all things with itself, but we deny that 
the universal is rendered logically explicit and is thought 
in the intuition. Useless also is the appeal to the principle 
of the unity of the spirit, which is not broken, but, on the 
contrary, strengthened by the clear distinction of fancy from 
thought, because from the distinction comes opposition, and 
from opposition concrete unity. 
Ideality (as has also been called this character that dis- 
tinguishes the intuition from the concept, art from philoso- 
phy and from history, from the affirmation of the universal 
and from the perception or narration of what has hap- 
pened) is the intimate virtue of art: no sooner are reflection 
and judgment deveIoped from that ideality, than art is dis- 
sipated and dies: it dies in the artist, who becomes a critic; 
it dies in the contemplator, who changes from an entranced 
enjoyer of art to a meditative obseiver of life. 
But the distinction of art from philosophy (taken widely 
as including all thinking of the real) brings with it other 
distinctions, among which that of art from myth occupies 
the foremost place. For myth, to him who believes in it, 
presents itself as the revelation and knowledge of reality 
as opposed to unreality,-a reality that drives away other 
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beliefs as illusory or false. It can become art only for him 
who no longer believes in it and avails himself of mythology 
as a metaphor, of the austere world of the gods as of a 
beautiful world, of God as of an image of sublimity. Con- 
sidered, then, in its genuine reality, in the soul of the believer 
and not of the unbeliever, it is religion and not simple fancy; 
and religion is philosophy, philosophy in process of becom- 
ing, philosophy more or less imperfect, but philosophy, as 
philosophy is religion, more or less purified and elaborated, 
in continuous process of elaboration and purification, but 
religion or thought of the Absolute or Eteinal. Art lacks 
the thought that is necessary ere it can become myth and 
religion, and the faith that is born of thought; the artist 
neither believes nor disbelieves in his image: he produces 
it. And, for a different reason, the concept of art as in- 
tuition excludes, on the other hand, the conception of art as 
the production of classes and types, species and genera, or 
again (as a great mathematician and philosopher had occa- 
sion to say of music), as an exercise of unconscious arith- 
metic; that is, it distinguishes a1-t from the positive sciences 
and from mathematics, in both of which appears the con- 
ceptual form, though without realistic character, as mere 
general representation or mere abstraction. But that ideal- 
ity which natural and mathematical science would seem to 
assume, as opposed to the world of philosophy, of religion 
and of history, and which would seem to approximate it to 
art (and owing to which scientists and mathematicians of 
our day are so ready to boast of creating worlds, of fictiones, 
resembling the fictions and figurations of the poets, even in 
their vocabulary), is gained with the renunciation of con- 
crete thought, by means of generalisation and abstraction, 
whicli are capricious, volitional decisions, practical acts, and, 
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as practical acts, extraneous and inimical to the world of 
art. Thus it happens that art manifests much more repug- 
nance toward the positive and mathematical sciences than 
toward philosophy, religion and history, because these seem 
to it to be fellow-citizens of the same world of theory or of 
knowledge, whereas those others shock it with the brutality 
toward contemplation of the practical world. Poetry and 
classification, and, worse still, poetry and mathematics, ap- 
pear to be as little in agreement as fire and water: the esprit 
mathe'matique and the esprit scientifique, the most declared 
enemies of the esprit poe'tique; those periods in which the 
natural sciences and mathematics prevail (for example, the 
intellectualism of the eighteenth century) seem to be the 
least fruitful in poetry. 
And since this vindication of the alogical character of art 
is, as I have said, the most difficult and important of the 
negations included in the formula of art-intuition, the 
theories that attempt to explain art as philosophy, as re- 
ligion, as history, or as science, and in a lesser degree as 
mathematics, occupy the greater part of the history of 
zsthetic science and are adorned with the names of the 
greatest philosophers. Schelling and Hegel afford examples 
of the identification or confusion of art with religion and 
philosophy in the eighteenth century; Taine, of its confusion 
with the natural sciences; the theories of the French verists, 
of its confusion with historical and documentary observa- 
tion; the formalism of the Herbartians, of its confusion with 
mathematics. But it would be vain to seek pure examples of 
these errors in any of these authors and in the others that 
might be mentioned, because error is never pure, for if it 
were so, it would be truth. Thus the doctrines of art that 
for the sake of brevity I shall term "conceptualistic" contain 
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elements of dissolution, the more copious and efficacious 
by as much as the spirit of the philosopher who professed 
them was energetic, and therefore nowhere are they so 
copious and efficacious as in Schelling and Hegel, who thus 
had so lively a consciousness of artistic production as to sug- 
gest by their observations and their particular developments 
a theory opposed to that maintained in their systems. Fur- 
thermore, the very conceptualistic theories are superior to 
the others previously examined, not only in so far as they 
recognise the theo~.etic character of art, but also carry with 
them their contribution to the true doctrine, owing to the 
claim that they make for a deteimination of the relations 
(which, if they be of distinction, are also of unity) between 
fancy and logic, between art and thought. 
And here we can already see how the simplest formula, 
that "art is intuition,"-which, translated into other sym- 
bolical terms (for example, that "art is the work of fancy"), 
is to be found in the mouths of all those who daily discuss 
art, and is to be found in older tems ("imitation," "ficticnl," 
"fable," etc.) in so many old boolts,-pronounced now in the 
text of a philosop!lical discourse, becomes filled with a his- 
torical, critical, and polemical content, of which I can hardly 
here give any example. And it will no longer cause astonish- 
ment that its philosophical conquest should have cost an 
especially great amount of toil, because that conquest is like 
setting foot upon a little hill long fought for in battle. Its 
easy ascent by the thoughtless pedestrian in time of peace 
is a veiy different matter; it is not a simple resting-place 
on a walk, but the syn~bol and result of the victory of an 
army. The historian of =sthetic follows the steps of its diffi- 
cult progress, in which (and this is another magical act of 
thought) the conqueror, instead of losing strength through 
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the blows that his adversary inflicts upon him, acquires new 
strength through these very blows, and reaches the sighed-for 
eminence, repulsing his adversary, and yet in his company. 
Here I cannot do more than record in passing the importance 
of the Aristotelian concept of mimesis (arising in opposition 
to the Platonic condemnation of poetry), and the attempt 
made by the same philosopher to distinguish poetry and his- 
tory: a concept that was not s&ciently developed, and per- 
haps not altogether mature in his mind, and therefore long 
misunderstood, but which was yet to serve, after many cen- 
turies, as the point of departure for modern zsthetic 
thought. And I will mention in passing the ever-increasing 
consciousness of the difference between logic and fancy, be- 
tween judgment and taste, between intellect and genius, 
which became ever more lively during the course of the sev- 
enteenth century, and the solemn form which the contest 
between Poetry and Metaphysic assumed in the "Scienza 
Nuova" of Vico; and also the scholastic construction of an 
astheticn, distinct from a Logica, as Gnoseologia infeAor 
and Scientia cognitionis sensitivz, in Baumgarten, who, how- 
ever, remained involved in the conceptualistic conception of 
art, and did not carry out his project; and the Critique of 
Kant directed against Baumgarten and all the Leibnitzians 
and Wolffians, which made it clear that intuition is intuition 
and not a "confused concept"; and romanticism, which per- 
haps better developed the new idea of art, announced by 
Vico, in its artistic criticism and in its histories than in its 
systems; and, finally, the criticism inaugurated in Italy by 
Francesco de Santis, who caused art as pure form, or pure 
intuition, to prevail over all utilitarianism, moraIism, and 
conceptualism (to adopt his vocabulary). 
But doubt springs up at  the feet of truth, "like a young 
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shoot,"-as the terxina of father Dante has it,-doubt, which 
is what drives the intellect of man "from mount to mount." 
The doctrine of art as intuition, as fancy, as form, now gives 
rise to an ulterior (I have not said an "ultimate") problem, 
which is no longer one of opposition and distinction toward 
physics, hedonistic, ethic and logic, but the field of images 
itself, which sets in doubt the capacity of the image to de- 
fine the character of art and is in reality occupied with the 
mode of separating the genuine from the spurious image, 
and of enriching in this way the concept of the image and 
of art. What function (it is asked) can a world of pure 
images possess in the spirit of man, without philosophical, 
historical, religious or scientific value, and without even 
moral or hedonistic value? What is more vain than to dream 
with open eyes in life, which demands, not only open eyes, 
but an open mind and a nimble spirit? Pure images! But to 
nourish oneself upon pure images is called by a name of 
little honour, "to dream," and there is usually added to 
this the epithet of "idle." I t  is a very insipid and inconclu- 
sive thing; can it ever be art? Certainly, we sometimes 
amuse ourselves with the reading of some sensational ro- 
mance of adventure, where images follow images in the most 
various and unexpected way; but we thus enjoy ourselves in 
moments of fatigue, when we are obliged to kill time, and 
with a full consciousness that such stuff is not art. Such in- 
stances are of the nature of a pastime, a game; but were art 
a game or a pastime, it would fall into the wide arms of 
hedonistic doctrine, ever open to receive it. And it is a 
utiIitarian and hedonistic need that impels us sometimes to 
relax the bow of the mind and the bow of the will, and to 
stretch ourselves, allowing images to follow one another in 
our memory, or combining them in quaint forms with the aid 
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of the imagination, in a sort of waking sleep, from which we 
rouse ourselves as soon as we are rested; and we sometimes 
rouse ourselves just to devote ourselves to the work of art, 
which cannot be produced by a mind relaxed. Thus either 
art is not pure intuition, and the claims put forward in the 
doctrines which we believed we had above confuted, are not 
satisfied, and so the confutation itself of these doctrines is 
troubled with doubts; or intuition cannot consist in a simple 
act of imagination. 
In order to render the problem more exact and more diffi- 
cult, it will be well t o  eliminate from it at once that part to 
which the answer is easy, and which I have not wished to 
neglect, precisely because it is usually united and confused 
with it. The intuition is the product of an image, and not of 
an incoherent mass of images obtained by recalling former 
images and allowing them to succeed one another capri- 
ciously, by combining one image with another in a like capri- 
cious manner, joining a horse's neck to a human head, and 
thus playing a childish game. Old Poetic availed itseIf 
above all of the concept of unity, in order to express this 
distinction between the intuition and imagining, insisting 
that whatever the artistic work, it should be simplex et 
ununz; or of the allied concept of unity in va~~iety-that is to 
say, the multiple images were to find their common centre 
unit of union in a comprehensive image: and the aesthetic of 
the nineteenth century created with the same object the dis- 
tinction, which appears in not a few of its philosophers, 
between fancy (the peculiar artistic faculty) and imagina- 
tion (the extra-artistic faculty). To amass, select, cut up, 
combine images, presupposes the possession of particular 
images in the spirit; and fancy produces, whereas imagina- 
tion is sterile, adapted to extrinsic combinations and not to 
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the generation of organism and life. The most profound 
problem, contained beneath the rather superficial formula 
with which I first presented it, is, then: What is the office 
of the pure image in the life of the spirit? or (which at 
bottom amounts to the same thing), How does the pure 
image come into existence? Every inspired work of art gives 
rise to a long series of imitators, who just repeat, cut up in 
pieces, combine, and mechanically exaggerate that work, 
and by so doing play the part of imagination toward or 
against the fancy. But what is the justiikation, or what the 
genesis, of the work of genius, which is afterward submitted 
(a sign of gloryl) to such torments? In order to make t?ais 
point clear, we must go deeply into the character of fancy 
or pure intuition, 
And the best way to prepare this deeper study is to recall 
to mind and to criticise the theories with which it has been 
sought to differentiate artistic intuition from merely inco- 
herent inlagination (while taking care not to fall into real- 
ism or conceptualism), to establish in what the principle of 
unity consists, and to justify the productive character of the 
fancy. The artistic image (it has been said) is such, when 
it unites the intelligible with the sensible, and represents an 
idea, Now "intelligible" and 'idea" cannot mean anything 
but concept (nor has it a different meaning with those who 
maintain this doctrine); even though it be the concrete con- 
cept or idea, proper to lofty philosophical speculation, which 
differs from the abstract concept or from the representative 
concept of the sciences. But in any case, the concept or idea 
always unites the intelligible to the sensible, and not only 
in art, for the new concept of the concept, first stated by 
Kant and (so to speak) immanent in all modern thought, 
heals the breach between the sensible and the intelligible 
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worlds, conceives the concept as judgment, and the judgment 
as synthesis a p~iori, and the synthesis a priori as the word 
become Besh, as history. Thus that definition of art leads 
the fancy back: to logic and art to philosophy, contrary to 
intention; and is at most valid for the abstract conception of 
science, not for the problem of art (the ~s the t i c  and teleo- 
logical "Critique of Judgment" of Kant had precisely this 
historical function of correcting what of abstract there yet 
remained in the "Critique of Pure Reason"). To seek a 
sensible element for the concept, beyond that which it has 
already absorbed in itself as concrete concept, and beyond 
the words in which it expresses itself, would be superfluous, 
If we persist in this search, it is true that we abandon the 
conception of art as philosophy or history, but only to pass 
to the conception of art as allegory. And the unsurrnounta- 
ble difiiiculties of the allegory are well known, as its frigid 
and anti-historical character is known and universally felt. 
Allegory is the extrinsic union, the conventional and arbi- 
trary juxtaposition of two spiritual acts, a concept or thought 
and an image, where i t  is assumed that this image must 
represent that concept. And not only is the individual char- 
acter of the artistic image not explained by this, but, in addi- 
tion, a duality is purposely created, because thought remains 
thought and image image in this juxtaposition, without rela- 
tion between themselves; so much so, that in contemplating 
the image, we forget the concept without any disadvantage, 
-indeed, with advantage,-and in thinking the concept, we 
dissipate, also with advantage, the superfluous and tiresome 
image, Allegory enjoyed much favour in the Middle Ages, 
that mixture of Gerillanism and Romanism, of barbarism 
and culture, of bold fancy and of acute reflection; but it was 
the theoretic element in and not the effective reality of, the 
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same medizval art which, where it is a&, drives allegory 
away from or resolves it in itseIf. This need for the solution 
of allegorical dualism leads to the refining of the theory of 
intuition, in so far as it is allegory of the idea, into the other 
theory, of the intuition as-symbol; for the idea does not 
stand by itself in the symbol, thinkable separately from the 
symbolising representation, nor does the symbol stand by it- 
self, representable in a lively manner without the idea sym- 
bolised. The idea is all reduced to representation (as said 
the ~sthetician Vischer, if to anyone belongs the blame of 
the very prosaic comparison for so poetic and metaphysical 
a theme), like a lump of sugar melted in a glass of water, 
which exists and acts in every molecule of water, but is no 
longer to be found as a lump of sugar, But the idea that 
has disappeared, the idea that has become entirely repre- 
sentative, the idea that we can no longer succeed in seizing 
as idea (save by extracting it, like sugar from sugared 
water), is no longer idea, and is only the sign that the unity 
of the artistic image has not yet been achieved. Certainly 
art is symbol, all symbol-that is, all significant; but syn~bol 
of what? What does it mean? The intuition is truIy artistic, 
it is tivly intuition, and not a chaotic mass of images, only 
when it has a vital principle that animates it, making it all 
one with itself; but what is this principle? 
The answer to such a queston may be said to result from 
the examination of the greatest ideal strife that has ever 
taken place in the field of art (and is not confined to the 
epoch that took its name from it and in which it was pre- 
dominant): the strife between romanticism and classicism. 
Giving the general definition, here convenient, and setting 
aside minor and accidental determinations, romanticism asks 
of art, above all, the spontaneous and violent effusion of the 
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affections, of love and hate, of anguish and jubilation, of des- 
peration and elevation; and is willingly satisfied and pleased 
with vaporous and indeterminate images, broken and allu- 
sive in style, with vague suggestions, wit11 approximate 
phrases, with powerful and troubled sketches: while classi- 
cism loves the peaceful soul, the wise design, figures studied 
in their characteristics and precise in outline, ponderation, 
equilibrium, clarity; and resolutely tends toward represen- 
tation, as the other tends toward feeling. And whoever puts 
himself at one or the other point of view finds crowds of 
reasons for maintaining it and for confuting the opposite 
point of view; because (say the romantics), What is the 
use of an art, rich in beautiful images, which, nevertheless, 
does not speak to the heart? And if it do speak to the 
heart, what is the use if the images be not beautiful? And 
the others will say, What is the use of the shock of the pas- 
sions, if the spisit do not rest upon a beautiful image? 
And if the image be beautiful, if our taste be satisfied, 
what matters the absence of those en~otions which can all 
of them be obtained outside art, and which life does not 
fail to provide, sometimes in greater quantity than we de- 
sire?-But when we begin to feel weary of the fruitless 
defence of both partial views; above all, when we turn 
away from the ordinary works of art produced by the ro- 
mantic and classical schools, from works convulsed with 
passion or coldly decorous, and fix then1 on the works, 
not of the disciples, but of the masters, not of the medio- 
cre, but of the supreme, we see the contest disappear in 
the distance and find ourselves unable to call the great por- 
tions of these works, romantic or classic or representative, 
because they are both classic and somantic, feelings and 
representations, a vigorous feeling which has become all 
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most brilliant representation. Such, for example, are the 
works of Hellenic art, and such those of Italian poetry 
and art: the transcendentalism of the Middle Ages became 
fixed in the bronze of the Dantesque temina; melancholy 
and suave fancy, in the transparency of the songs and son- 
nets of Petrarch; sage experience of life and badinage with 
the fables of the past, in the limpid ottava ~ i m a  of Ariosto; 
heroism and the thought of death, in the perfect blank-verse 
hendecasyllabics of Foscolo; the infinite variety of eveiy- 
thing, in the sober and austere songs of Giacomo Leopardi. 
Finally (be it said in parenthesis and without intending 
comparison with the other examples adduced), the volup- 
tuous refinements and animal sensuality of international 
decadentism have received their most perfect expression in 
f i e  prose and verse of an Italian, D'Annunzio. All these souls 
were profoundly passionate (all, even the serene Lodovico 
Ariosto, who was so amorous, so tender, and so often re- 
presses his emotion with a smile); their worlcs of art are the 
eternal flower that springs from their passions. 
These expressions and these critical judgments can be 
theoretically resumed in the formula, that what gives co- 
herence and unity to the intuition is feeling: the intuition is 
really such because it represents a feeling, and can only ap- 
pear from and upon that, Not the idea, but the feeling, is 
what confers upon art the airy lightness of the symbol: an 
aspiration enclosed in the circle of a representation-that is 
art; and in it the aspiration alone stands for the representa- 
tion, and the representation alone for the aspiration. Epic 
and lyric, or drama and lyric, are scholastic divisions of the 
indivisible: art is always lyrical-that is, epic and dramatic 
in feeling. What we admire in genuine works of art is the 
perfect fanciful form which a state of the soul assumes; and 
we calI this life, unity, solidity of the work of art. What 
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displeases us in the false and imperfect forms is the struggle 
of several different states of the soul not yet unified, their 
stratification, or mixture, their vacillating method, which 
obtains apparent unity from the will of the author, who for 
this purpose avails himself of an abstract plan or idea, or of 
extra-aesthetic, passionate emotion. A series of images 
which seem to be, each in turn, iich in power of conviction, 
leaves us nevertheless deluded and diffident, because we do 
not see them generated from a state of the soul, from a 
"sketch" (as the painters call it), from a motive; and they 
follow one another and crowd together without that precise 
intonation, without that accent, which comes from the heart. 
And what is the figure cut out from the background of the 
picture or transported and placed against another back- 
ground, what is the personage of drama or of romance out- 
side his relation with all the other personages and with the 
general action? And what is the value of this general action 
if it be not an action of the spirit of the author? The secular 
disputes concerning dramatic unity are interesting in this 
connection; they are first applied to the unity of "action" 
when they have been obtained from an extrinsic deteimina- 
tion of time and place, and this finally applied to the unity 
of "interest," and the interest would have to be in its turn 
dissolved in the interest of the spirit of the poet-that is, in 
his intimate aspiration, in his feeling. The negative issue of 
the great dispute between classicists and romanticists is in- 
teresting, for it resulted in the negation both of the ai-t which 
strives to distract and illude the soul as to the deficiency of 
the image with mere feeling, with the practical violence of 
feeling, with feeling that has not become contemplation, and 
of the art which, by means of the supei-ficial clearness of the 
image, of drawing correctly false, of the word falsely correct, 
seeks to deceive as to its lack of inspiration and its lack of 
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an aesthetic reason to justify what it has produced. A cele- 
brated sentence uttered by an English critic, and become 
one of the commonplaces of journalism, states that 'all the 
arts tend to the condition of music"; but it would have been 
more accurate to say that all the arts are music, if it be thus 
intended to emphasise the genesis of zsthetic images in feel- 
ing, excluding from their number those mechanically con- 
structed or realistically ponderous. And another not less 
celebrated utterance of a Swiss semi-philosopher, which has 
had the like good or bad fortune of becoming trivial, dis- 
covers that "every landscape is a state of the soul": which is 
indisputable, not because the landscape is landscape, but 
because the landscape is art. 
Artistic intuition, then, is always lyrical intuition: this lat- 
ter being a word that is not present as an adjective or defini- 
tion of the first, but as a synonym, another of the synonyms 
that can be united to the several that I have mentioned al- 
ready, and which, all of them, designate the intuition. And 
if it be sometimes convenient that instead of appearing as a 
synonym, it should assume the grammatical form of the ad- 
jective, that is only to make clear the difFerence between the 
intuition-image, or nexus of images (for what is called irn- 
age is always a nexus of images, since image-atoms do not 
exist any more than thought-atoms), which constitutes the 
organism, and, as organism, has its vital principle, which is 
the organism itself,-between this, which is true and proper 
intuition, and that false intuition which is a heap of images 
put together in play or intentionally or for some other practi- 
cal purpose, the connection of which, being practical, shows 
itself to be not organic, but mechanic, when considered from 
the zsthetic point of view. But the word lyric would be re- 
dundant save in this explicative or polemical sense; and art 
is perfectly defined when it is simply defined as intuition. 
PREJUDICES RELATING TO ART 
T HERE can be no doubt that the process of distinction of art from the facts and the acts with which it has been 
and is confused, which I have summarily traced, necessitates 
no small mental effort; but this effort is rewarded with the 
freedom which it affords of handling the many fallacious 
distinctions which disfigure the field of ~sthetic. These, al- 
though they do not present any difficulty in thinking out (in- 
deed, at first they seduce by their very facility and deceitful 
self-evidence), yet imply the other and greater annoyance of 
preventing all profound understanding, and indeed of mak- 
ing it impossible to understand anything as to what art truly 
is. I t  is true that many people, in order to retain the power 
of repeating vulgar and traditional distinctions, voluntarily 
resign themselves to this ignorance. We, on the contrary, 
now prefer to throw them all away, as a useless hindrance in 
the new task to which the new theoretic position that we 
have attained invites and leads us, and to enjoy the greater 
facility which comes from feeling rich. Wealth is not only to 
be obtained by acquiring many objects, but, on the contrary, 
by getting rid of all those that represent economic debt. 
Let us begin with the most famous of these economic 
debts in the circle of aesthetic: the distinction between con- 
tent and fol-rn, which has caused a division of schools even 
in the nineteenth century: the schools of the aesthetic of the 
content (GehaZtszstl~etilc) and that of the aesthetic of folm 
(Fo~msthetik) .  The problems from which these opposed 
schools arose were, in general, the following: Does art con- 
sist soIe1y of the content, or solely of the form, or of content 
and form together? What is the character of the content, 
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what that of the Esthetic form?-It was answered, on tile 
one hand, that art, the essence of art, is all contained in the 
content, defined as that which pleases, or as what is moral, 
or as what raises man to the heaven of religion or of meta- 
physic, or as what is historically correct, or, finally, as what 
is naturally and physically beautiful. And, on the other hand, 
that tile content is indifterent, that it is simply a peg or hook 
from which beautiful forms are suspended, which alone be- 
atify the Esthetic spirit: unity, harmony, symmetry, and so 
on. And on both sides it was attempted to attract the element 
that had previously been excluded from the essence of art 
as subordinate and secondary: those for the content admit- 
ted that it was an advantage to the content (which, accord- 
ing to them, was really the constitutive element of the 
beautiful) to adorn itself with beautiful forms also, and to 
present itself as unity, symmetry, harmony, etc.; and the 
formalists, in their turn, admitted that if art did not gain by 
the value of its content, its effect did, not a single value, but 
the sum of two values being in this case offered. These doc- 
trines, which attained their greatest scholastic bulk in Ger- 
many with the Hegelians and the Herbartians, is also to be 
found more or less everywhere in the history of h st he tic, 
ancient, mediaeval, modern, and most modern; and is what 
amounts to most in common opinion, for nothing is more 
common than to hear that a drama is beautiful in 'cform," but 
a fa i l~~re  in "content"; that a poem is "most nobly" conceived, 
but "executed in ugly verse"; that a painter would have been 
greater did he not waste his power as a designer and as a 
colourist, upon 'small and unworthy themes," instead of se- 
lecting, on the contrary, those of a historical, patriotic, or 
socioIogica1 character. I t  may be said that fine taste and true 
critical sense of art have to defend themselves at every step 
against the perversions of judgment arising from these doc- 
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trines, in which philosophers become the crowd, and the 
crowd feels itself philosophical, because in agreement with 
those crowd-philosophers. The origin of these theories is no 
secret for us, because, even in the brief sketch that we have 
given, it is quite clear that they have sprung from the trunk 
of hedonistic, moralistic, conceptualistic, or physical concep- 
tions of art: they are all doctrines which, failing to perceive 
what makes art art, were obliged somehow to regain art, 
which they had allowed to escape them, and to reintroduce 
it in the form of an accessory or accidental element; the up- 
holders of the theory of the content conceived it as an ab- 
stract formal element, the formalists as the abstract element 
of the content. What interests us in those zesthetics is just this 
dialectic, in which the theorists of the content become forma- 
lists against their will, and the formalists upholders of the 
theory of the content; thus each passes over to occupy the 
other's place, but to be restless there and to return to their 
own, which gives rise to the same restlessness. The "beauti- 
ful forms" of Herbart do not differ in any way from the "beau- 
tiful contentsy' of the Hegelians, because both are nothing. 
And we become yet more interested to observe their efforts 
to get out of prison, and the blows with which they weaken 
its doors or its walls, and the air-holes which some of those 
thinkers succeed in opening.-Their efforts are clumsy and 
sterile, like those of the theorists of the content (they are to 
be seen in a repulsive form in the Philosophie des Schonen 
of Hartmann), who, by adding stitch to stitch, composed a 
net of ''beautiful contents" (beautiful, sublime, comic, tragic, 
I.uumouristic, pathetic, idyllic, sentimental, etc., etc.), in 
which veiy coarse net they tried to enclose every form of 
reality, even that which they had called "ugly." They failed 
to perceive that their zesthetic content, thus made to enclose 
little by little the whole of reality, has no longer any charac- 
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ter that distinguishes it from other contents, since there is no 
content beyond reality; and that therefore their fundamental 
theory was thus fundamentally negated. These contradic- 
tory and ingenuous explosions resemble those of other formal- 
istic theorists of the content who maintained the concept of 
an zesthetic content, but defined it as that "which interests 
man," and made the interest relating to man to lie in his dif- 
ferent historical situations-that is, relative to the individual. 
This was another way of denying the initial assumption, for 
it is very clear that the artist would not produce art, did he 
not interest himself in something which is the datum or the 
problem of his production, but that this something becomes 
art only because the artist, by becoming interested in it, 
makes it so.-These are evasions of foimalists, who after hav- 
ing limited art to abstract beautiful forms, void of all content 
and only to be summed up with contents, timidly introduced 
among beautiful fonns that of the harmony of content with 
form; or more resolutely declared themselves partisans of a 
sort of eclecticism, which makes art to consist of a sort of 
"relation" of the beautful content with the beautiful form, 
and, with an incorrectness worthy of eclectics, attributed to 
terms outside the relation qualities which they assume only 
within the relation. 
For the tsuth is really this: content and form niust be 
clearly distinguished in art, but must not be separately quali- 
fied as artistic, precisely because their relation only is artistic 
-that is, their unity, understood not as an abstract, dead 
unity, but as concrete and living, which is that of the synthe- 
sis a priori; and art is a tsue zsthetic synthesis LJ priori of feel- 
ing and image in the intuition, as to which it may be re- 
peated that feeling without image is blind, and image with- 
out feeling is void. FeeIing and image do not exist for the 
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artistic spirit outside the synthesis; they will have existence 
from another point of view in another plane of knowledge, 
and feeling will be the practical aspect of the spirit that 
loves and hates, desires and dislikes, and the image will be 
the inanimate residue of art, the withered leaf, prey of the 
wind of imagination and of amusement's caprice. All this has 
no concern with the artist or the ~sthetician: just as art is no 
vain fancying, so is it not tumultuous passionality, but the 
uplifting of that act by means of another act, or, if it be pre- 
ferred, the substitution of that tumult for another tumult, 
that of the longing to create and to contemplate for the joys 
and the sorrows of artistic creation. It is therefore indifferent, 
or a question of teiminological opportunity, whether we 
should present art as content or as form, provided it be al- 
ways recognised that the content is formed and the form 
filled, that feeling is figurative feeling and the figure a fig- 
ure that is felt. And it is only owing to historical deference 
toward him who better than others caused the concept of 
the autonomy of art to be appreciated, and wished to affirm 
this autonomy with the word "form," thus opposing alike the 
abstract theory of the content of the philosophisers and 
moralists and the abstract formalism of the academicians,- 
in deference, I say, to De Sanctis, and also because of the 
ever active polemic against the attempts to absorb art in 
other modes of spiritual activity,-that the zesthetic of the in- 
tuition can be called "Bsthetic of form." I t  is useless to re- 
fute an objection that certainly might be made (but rather 
with the sophistry of the advocate than with the acuteness 
of the scientist), namely, that the zesthetic of the intuition al- 
so, since it describes the content of art as feeling or state of 
the soul, qualifies it outside the intuition, and seems to ad- 
mit that a content, which is not feeling or a state of the soul, 
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does not lend itself to artistic elaboration, and is not an 
aesthetic content. Feeling, or the state of the soul, is not a par- 
ticular content, but the whole universe seen sub specie in- 
tuitionis; and outside it there is no other content conceivable 
that is not also a different form of the intuitive form; not 
thoughts, which are the whole universe sub specie cogita- 
tionis; not physical things and mathematical beings, which 
are the whole universe sub specie schematimi et abstrac- 
tionis; not wills, which are the whole universe sub specie uo- 
litionis. 
Another not less fallacious distinction (to which the words 
"content" and "form" are also applied) separates intuition 
from expression, the image from the physical translation of 
the image. I t  places on one side phantasms of feeling, im- 
ages of men, of animals, of landscapes, of actions, of adven- 
tures, and so on; and on the other, sounds, tones, Iines, col- 
ours, and so on; calling the first the external, the second the 
internal element of art: the art properly so-called, the other 
technique. It is easy to distinguish internal and external, at 
least in words, especially when no minute enquiry is made 
as to the reasons arid motives for the distinction, and when 
the distinction is just thrown down there without any service 
being demanded of it; so easy that by never thinking about 
it the distinction may eventua'tiy come to seem to thought 
indubitable. But it becomes a different question when, as 
must be done with every distinction, we pass from the act of 
distinguishing to that of establishing relation and unifying, 
because this time we run against desperate obstacles. What 
has here been distinguished cannot be unified, because it has 
been badly distinguished: how can something external and 
extraneous to the internal become united to the inteinal and 
express it? How can a sound or a colour express an image 
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without sound and without colour? How can the bodiless ex- 
press a body? How can the spontaneity of fancy and of re- 
flection and even technical action coincide in the same act? 
When the intuition has been distinguished from the expres- 
sion, and the one has been made different from the other, no 
ingenuity of terms can reunite them; all the processes of as- 
sociation, of habit, of mechanicising, of forgetting, of instinc- 
tification, proposed by the psychologists and IaboriousIy de- 
veloped by them, allow the scissure to reappear at the end: 
on one side the expression, on the other the image. And there 
does not seem to be any way of escape, save that of taking 
refuge in the hypothesis of a mystery which, according to 
poetical or matl~ematical tastes, will assume the appearance 
of a mysterious marriage or of a mysterious psychophysical 
parallelism. The first is a parallelism incorrectly overcome; 
the second, a marriage deferred to distant ages or to the ob- 
scurity of the unknowable. 
B U ~  before having recourse to mystery (a refuge to which 
there is always time to fly), we must enquire whether the 
two eIen~ents have been correctly distinguished, and if an 
intuition without expression be conceivable. I t  may happen 
that the thing is as little existing and as inconceivable as a 
soul without a body, which bas truly been as much talked of 
in pl~ilosoplzies as in religions, but to have talked about it is 
not the same thing as to have experienced and conceived it. 
In reality, we know nothing but expressed intuitions: a 
thought is not thought for us, unless it be possible to forrnu- 
late it in words; a musical fancy, only when it becomes con- 
crete in sounds; a pictorial image, only when it  is coIoured. 
We do not say that the words must necessarily be declaimed 
in a loud voice, the music performed, or the picture painted 
upon wood or canvas; but it is certain that when a thought 
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is really thought, when it has attained to the maturity of 
thought, the words run through our whole organism, solicit- 
ing the muscles of our mouth and ringing internally in our 
ears; when music is truly music, it trills in the throat and 
shivers in the fingers that touch ideal notes; when a pictorial 
image is pictorially real, we are impregnated with lymphs 
that are colours, and maybe, where the colouring matters 
were not at our disposition, we might spontaneously colour 
surrounding objects by a sort of irradiation, as is said of cer- 
tain hysterics and of certain saints, who caused the stigmata 
upon their hands and feet by means of an act of imagination! 
Thought, musical fancy, pictorial image, did not indeed ex- 
ist without expression, they did not exist at all previous to 
the formation of this expressive state of the spirit. To believe 
in their pre-existence is ingenuousness, if it be ingenuous to 
have faith in those impotent poets, painters, or musicians 
who always have their heads full of poetic, pictorial, and 
musical creations, and only fail to translate them into exter- 
nal form, either because, as they say, they axe impatient of 
expression, or because technique is not sufficiently advanced 
to afford sufficient means for their expression: many centu- 
ries ago it offered sufficient means to Homer, Pheidias, and 
Apelles, but it does not suffice for them, who, if we are ta  
believe them, carry in their mighty heads an art greater than 
those others! Sometimes, too, ingenuousness arises from the 
illusion due to keeping a bad account with ourselves that, 
having imagined, and consequently expressed, some few im- 
ages, we already possess in ourselves all the other images 
that must form part of a work, which we do not yet possess, 
as well as the vital nexus that should connect them, which 
is not yet formed and therefore is not expressed. 
Art, understood as intuition, according to the concept that 
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I have exposed, having denied the existence of a physical 
world outside of it, which it looks upon as simply a construc- 
tion of our intellect, does not know what to do with the par- 
allelism of the thinking substance and of substance extended 
in space, and has no need to promote impossible marriages, 
because its thinking substance-or, better, its intuitive act- 
is perfect in itself, and is that same fact which the intellect 
afterwards constructs as extended. And inasmuch as an im- 
age without expression is inconceivable, by just so much is 
an image which shall be also expression conceivable, and 
indeed logically necessary; that is, which shall be redly an 
image. If we take from a poem its metre, its rhythm, and its 
words, poetical thought does not, as some opine, remain be- 
hind: there remains nothing. The poetly is born, like those 
words, that rhythm, and that metre. Nor could exp~ession be 
compared with the epidermis of organisms, unless it be said 
(and perhaps this may not be false even in physiology) that 
all the organism in evely cell's cell is also epidermis. 
I should, however, be wanting to my methodological con- 
victions and to my intention of doing justice to errors (and I 
have already done justice to the distinction of form and con- 
tent by demonstrating the truth at which they aimed and 
failed to grasp), were I not to indicate what truth may also 
be active at the base of the false distinction of the indistin- 
guishable, intuition and expression. Fancy and technique are 
rationally distinguished, though not as elements of art; and 
they are related and united between themselves, though not 
in the field of art, but in the wider field of the spirit in its 
totality. Technical or practical problems to be solved, d 6 -  
culties to be vanquished, are truly present to the artist, and 
there is truly something which, without being really physical, 
and being, like everything real, a spiritual act, can be meta- 
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phoricised as physical in respect to the intuition. What is this 
something? The artist, whom we have left vibrating with ex- 
pressed images which break forth by infinite channels from 
his whole being, is a whole man, and therefore also a practi- 
cal man, and as such takes measures against losing the result 
of his spiritual labour, and in favour of rendering possible or 
easy, for himself and for others, the reproduction of his im- 
ages; hence he engages in practical acts which assist that 
work of reproduction. These practical acts are guided, as are 
all practical acts, by knowledge, and for this reason are 
called technical; and, since they are practical, they are dis- 
tinguished from contemplation, which is theoretical, and 
seem to be external to it, and are therefore called physical: 
and they assume this name the more easily in so far as they 
are fixed and made abstract by the intellect. Thus writing 
and phonography are united with words and music, canvas 
and wood and walls covered with colours, stone cut and in- 
cised, iron and bronze and other metals melted and moulded 
to certain shapes by sculpture and architecture. So distinct 
among themselves are the two forms of activity that it is pos- 
sible to be a great artist with a bad technique, a poet who 
corrects the proofs of his verses badly, an architect who 
makes use of unsuitable material or does not attend to statics, 
a painter who uses colours that deteriorate rapidly: examples 
of these weaknesses are so frequent that it is not worth while 
to cite any of them. But what is impossible is to be a great 
poet who writes verses badly, a great painter who does not 
give tone to his colours, a great architect who does not har- 
monise his lines, a great composer who does not harrnonise 
his notes; and, in short, a great artist who cannot express hirn- 
self. I t  has been said of Raphael that he would have been a 
great painter even if he had not possessed hands; but cer- 
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tainly not that he would have been a great painter if the 
sense of design and colour had been wanting to him. 
And (be it noted in passing, for I must condense as I pro- 
ceed) this apparent transformation of the intuitions into 
physical things-altogether analogous with the apparent 
transformation of wants and economic labour into things 
and into merchandise-also explains how people have come 
to talk not only of "artistic things" and of "beautiful things," 
but also of "a beautiful of nature." It is evident that, besides 
the instruments that are made for the reproduction of im- 
ages, objects already existing can be met with, whether pro- 
duced by Inan or not, which perform such a service-that is 
to say, are more or less adapted to fixing the memory of our 
intuitions; and these things take the name of "natural beau- 
ties," and exercise their fascination only when we know how 
to understand them with the same soul with which the art- 
ist or artists have taken and appropriated them, giving value 
to them and indicating the "point of view" from which we 
must look at them, thus connecting them with their own in- 
tuitions. But the always imperfect adaptability, the fugitive 
nature, the mutability of "natural beauties" also justify the 
inferior place accorded to them, compared with beauties 
produced by art. Let us leave it to rhetoricians or madmen 
to affirm that a beautiful tree, a beautiful river, a subIime 
mountain, or even a beautiful horse or a beautiful human fig- 
ure, are superior to the chisel-stroke of Michelangelo or the 
verse of Dante; but let us say, with greater propriety, that 
"Nature" is stupid compared with Art, and that she is "mute," 
if man does not make her speak. 
A third distinction, which also labours to distinguish the 
indistinguishable, is attached to the concept of the zesthetic 
expression, and divides it into two moments of expression 
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abstractly considered, propriety and beauty of expression, or 
adorned expression, founding upon these the classification of 
two orders of expression, naked and omate. This is a doctrine 
of which traces may be found in all the various domains of 
art, but which has not been developed in any one of them to 
the same extent as in that of words, where it bears a cele- 
brated name and is called "Rhetoric," and has had a very 
long history, from the Greek rhetoricians to our own day. It 
persists in the schools, in treatises, and even in esthetics of 
scientific pretensions, not to mention in common belief (as 
is natural), though in our day it has lost much of its primitive 
vigour. Men of lofty intellect have accepted it, or let it live, 
for centuries, owing to the force of inertia or of tradition; the 
few rebels have hardly ever attempted to reduce their rebel- 
lion to a system and to cut out the error at the roots. The 
injury done by Rhetoric, with its idea of "ornate" as differing 
from, and of greater value than, "naked" speech, has not 
been limited solely to the circle of esthetic, but has appeared 
also in criticism, and even in literary education, because, just 
as it was incapable of explaining perfect beauty, so it was 
adapted to provide an apparent justification for vitiated 
beauty, and to encourage writing in an inflated, affected, 
and improper form. However, the division which it intro- 
duces and on which it relies is a logical contradiction, be- 
cause, as is easy to prove, it destroys the concept itself, 
which it undertakes to divide into moments, and the objects, 
which it undertakes to divide into classes. An appropriate 
expression, if appropriate, is also beautiful, beauty being 
nothing but the determination of the image, and therefore 
of the expression; and if it be wished to indicate by calling it 
naked that there is something wanting which should be pres- 
ent, then the expression is inappropriate and deficient, 
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either it is not or is not yet expression. On the other hand, 
an ornate expression, if it be expressive in every part, can- 
not be called ornate, but as naked as the other, and as ap- 
propriate as the other; if it contain inexpressive, additional, 
extrinsic elements, it is not beautiful, but ugly, it is not or is 
not yet expression; to be so, it must purify itself of external 
elements (as the other must be enriched with the elements 
that are wanting). 
Expression and beauty are not two concepts, but a single 
concept, which it is permissible to designate with either sy- 
nonymous vocable: artistic fancy is always corporeal, but it is 
not obese, being always clad with itself and never charged 
with anything else, or "ornate." Certainly a problem was 
lurking beneath this falsest of distinctions, the necessity of 
making a distinction; and the problem (as can be deduced 
from certain passages in Aristotle, and from the psychology 
and gnoseology of the Stoics, and as we see it, intensified in 
the discussions of the Italian rhetoricians of the seventeenth 
century) was concerned with the relations between thought 
and fancy, philosophy and poetry, logic and zesthetic (dia- 
lectic and rhetoric, or, as was still said at the time, the "open" 
and the closed "fist"). "Naked" expression referred to 
thought and to philosophy, "ornate" expression to fancy and 
to poetry. But it is not less true that this problem as to the 
distinction between the two forms of the theoretical spirit 
could not be solved in the field of one of them, intuition or 
expression, where nothing will ever be found but fancy, 
poetry, zesthetic; and the undue introduction of logic will 
only project there a deceitful shadow, which will darken and 
hamper intelligence, depriving it of the view of art in its ful- 
ness and purity, without giving it that of logicity and of 
thought. 
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But the greatest injury caused by the rhetorical doctrine 
of "ornate" expression to the theoretical systematisation of 
the forms of the human spirit, concerns the treatment of lan- 
guage, because, granted that we admit naked and simply 
grammatical expressions, and expressions that are omate or 
rhetorical, language becomes an aggregate of naked expres- 
sions and is handed over to grammar, and, as an ulterior con- 
sequence (since grammar finds no place in rhetoric and 
aesthetic), to logic, where the subordinate office of a semei- 
otic or ars significandi is assigned to it. Indeed, the logistic 
conception of language is closely united and proceeds p a ~ i  
passu with the rhetorical doctrine of expression; they ap- 
peared together in Hellenic antiquity, and they still exist, 
though disputed, in our time. Rebellions against the logicis~n 
of the doctrine of language have rarely appeared, and have 
had as little efficacy as those against rhetoric; and only in the 
romantic period (traversed by Vico a century before) has a 
lively consciousness been foimed by certain thinkers as to 
the fantastic or metaphmic nature of language, and its closer 
connection with poetry than with logic. Yet since a more or 
less inartistic idea of art persisted even anlong the best (con- 
ceptualism, moralism, hedonism, etc.), there remained a 
very powerful impediment to the identification of language 
and art. This identification appears to be as unavoidable as 
it is easy, having established the concept of art as intuition 
and of intuition as expression, and therefore iillplicitly its 
identity with language: always assuming that language be 
conceived in its fulI extension, without arbitrary restrictions 
to so-called articulate language and witllout arbitrary ex- 
clusion of tonic, mimetic, and graphic; and in all its inten- 
sion-that is, taken in its reality, which is the act of speaking 
itself, witl~out falsifying it with the abstractions of grammars 
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and vocabularies, and with the foolish belief that man speaks 
with the vocabulaly and with grammar. Man speaks at every 
instant like the poet, because, like the poet, he expresses his 
impressions and his feelings in the folm called conversational 
or familiar, which is not separated by any abyss from the 
other forms called prosaic, poetic-prosaic, narrative, epic, 
dialogue, dramatic, lyric, melic, song, and so on. And if it do 
not displease man in general to be considered poet and al- 
ways poet (as he is by force of his humanity), it should not 
displease the poet to be united with common humanity, be- 
cause this union alone explains the power which poetry, 
understood in the loftiest and in the narrowest sense, wields 
over all human souls. Were poetry a language apart, a "lan- 
guage of the gods," men would not understand it; and if it 
elevate them, it elevates them not above, but within them- 
selves: true democracy and true aristocracy coincide in this 
field also. Coincidence of art and language, which implies, 
as is natural, coincidence of aesthetic and of philosophy of 
language, definable the one by the other and therefore 
identical,-this I ventured to place twelve years ago in the 
title of a treatise of mine on #sthetic, which has tmly not 
failed of its effect upon many linguists and philosophers of 
Bst l~et ic  in Italy and outside Italy, as is shewn by the copi- 
ous "literature7' which it has produced. This identscation 
will benefit studies on art and poetry by purifying them of 
hedonistic, moralistic, and conceptualistic residues, still to 
be found in such quantity in literary and artistic criticism. 
But the benefit which it will confer upon linguistic studies 
will be far more inestimable, for it is urgent that they should 
be disencumbered of physiological, psychological, and psy- 
chophysiological methods, now the fashion, and be freed 
from the ever returning theory of the conventional origin of 
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language, which has the inevitable correlative of the mysti- 
cal theory as its inevitable reaction, I t  will no longer be nec- 
essary to construct absurd parallelisms even for language, or 
to promote mysterious nuptials between sign and image: 
when language is no longer conceived as a sign, but as an 
image which is significant-that is, a sign in itself, and there- 
fore coloured, sounding, singing, articulate. The significant 
image is the spontaneous work of the human spirit, whereas 
the sign, wherewith man agrees with man, presupposes lan- 
guage; or if it be wished, nevertheless, to explain lan- 
guage by signs, i t  recommends us to call upon God, as upon 
the giver of the first signs-that is, to presuppose language 
in another way, by consigning it to the Unknowable. 
I shall conclude my account of the prejudices relating to 
art with that one of them which is most usual, because it  is 
mingled with the daily life of criticism, namely, history of 
art: prejudice of the possibility of distinguishing several or 
many particukr forms of a??, each one determinable in its 
own particular concept and within its limits, and furnished 
with its proper laws. This erroneous doctrine is embodied in 
two systematic series, one of which is known as the theo1.y of 
liferary and artistic kinds (lyric, drama, romance, epic and 
romantic poem, idyll, comedy, tragedy; sacred, civil-life, fa- 
miliar, from life, still-life, landscape, flower and fluit paint- 
ing; heroic, funereal, costume, sculpture; church, operatic, 
chamber music; civil, military, ecclesiastic architecture, etc., 
etc.), and the other as theory of the arts (poetry, painting, 
sculpture, architecture, music, art of the actor, gardening, 
etc., etc.). One of these sometimes figures as a subdivision 
of another. This prejudice, of which it is easy to trace the 
origin, has its first notable monuments in Hellenic culture, 
and persists in our days. Many zestheticians still write trea- 
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tises on the ~s the t i c  of the tragic, the comic, the lyric, the 
humorous, and zsthetics of painting, of music, or of poetry 
(these last are still called by the old name of ccpoetics"); and, 
what is worse (though but IittIe attention is paid to these 
zstheticians who are impelled to write through solitary dil- 
ettantism or academic profession), critics, in judging works 
of art, have not altogether abandoned the habit of judging 
them according to the genus or particular form of art to 
which, according to the above zestheticians, they should be- 
long; and, instead of clearly stating whether a worlc be beau- 
tiful or ugly, they proceed to reason their impressions, say- 
ing that it well observes, or wrongly violates, the laws of the 
drama, or of romance, or of painting, or of bas-relief. It is 
also very common in aU count~+ies to treat artistic and liter- 
ary history as history of kinds, and to present the artists as 
cultivating this or that kind; and to divide the work of an 
artist, which always has unity of development, whatever 
form it take, whether lyric, romance or drama, into as many 
compartments as there are kinds; so that Lodovico Ariosto, 
for example, appears now among the cultivators of the Latin 
poetry of the Renaissance, now among the authors of the 
first Latin satires, now among those of the first comedies, 
now among those who brought the poem of chivalry to per- 
fection: as though Latin poetry, satire, comedy, and poem 
were not always the same poet, Ariosto, in his experiments, 
in his logic, and in the manifestations of his spiritual devel- 
opment. 
I t  is not to be denied that the theory of kinds and of the 
arts has not had, and does not now possess, its own internal 
dialectic and its autocriticism, or irony, according as we may 
please to call it; and no one is ignorant that literary history 
is full of these cases of an established style, against which an 
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artist of genius offends in his work and calls forth the repro- 
bation of the critics: a reprobation which does not, however, 
succeed in suffocating the admiration for, and the popularity 
of, his work, so that finally, when it is not possible to blaine 
the artist and it is not wished to blame the critic of kinds, the 
matter ends with a compromise, and the kind is enlarged or 
accepts beside it a new kind, like a legitimated bastard, and 
the compronlise lasts, by force of inertia, until a new work 
of genius comes to upset again the fixed rule. An irony of the 
doctrine is also the impossibility, in which the theoreticians 
find themselves, of logically fixing the boundaries between 
the kinds and the arts: all the definitions that they have pro- 
duced, when examined rather more closely, either evaporate 
in the general definition of ai-t, or shew themselves to be an 
arbitrary raising to the rank of kinds and rules particular 
works of art irreducible to rigorous logical terms. Absurdities 
resulting from the effort to determine rigorously what is in- 
determinable, owing to the contradictory nature of the at- 
tempt, are to be found even among the great ones, even in 
Lessing, who arrives at this extravagant conclusion, that 
painting represents '%odies7': bodies, not actions and souls, 
not the action and the soul of the painter1 They are also to be 
found among the questions that logically arise from that il- 
logic: thus, a definite field having been assigned to every 
kind and to every art, what kind and what art is superior? Is 
painting superior to sculpture, drama to  lyric? And again, 
the forces of art having been thus divided, would it not be 
advisable to reunite them in a type of work of art which shall 
drive away other forces, as a coalition of armies drives away 
a single army: will not the work, for instance, in which po- 
etry, music, scenic art, decoration, are united, develop a 
greater ~ s t h e t i c  force than a Lied of Goethe or a drawing of 
Leonardo? These are questions, distinctions, judgments, and 
The Breviary of Aesthetic 4'7 
definitions which arouse the revolt of the poetic and artistic 
sense, which Ioves each work for itself, for what it is, as a liv- 
ing creature, individual and incomparable, and knows that 
each work has its individual law. Hence has arisen the disa- 
greement between the affirmative judgment of artistic souls 
and the negative one of professional critics, between the 
negation of the former and the affirmation of the latter; and 
the professional critics pass for pedants, not without good 
reason, although artistic souls are in their turn "disarmed 
prophets7'-that is, incapable of reasoning and of deducing 
the correct theory immanent in their judgments, and of op- 
posing it to the pedantic theory of their adversaries. 
That correct theory is precisely an aspect of the concep- 
tion of art as intuition, or lyrical intuition; and, since every 
work of art expresses a state of the soul, and the state of the 
soul is individual and always new, the intuition implies in- 
finite intuitions, which it is impossible to place in pigeon- 
holes as kinds, unless these be infinite pigeonholes, and there- 
fore not pigeonholes of kinds, but of intuitions. And since, on 
the other hand, individuality of intuition implies individu- 
ality of expression, and a picture is distinct from another 
picture, not less than from a poem, and picture and poem 
are not of value because of the sounds that beat the air and 
the coiours refracted by the light, but because of what they 
can tell to the spirit, in so far as they enter into it, it is use- 
less to have recourse to abstract means of expression, to con- 
struct the other series of kinds and classes: which amounts 
to saying that any theory of the division of the arts is with- 
out foundation. The kind or cIass is in this case one only, art 
itself or the intuition, whereas single wosks of art are infinite: 
all are original, each one incapable of being translated into 
the other (since to translate, to translate with artistic skill, 
is to create a new work of art), each one uncontrolled by the 
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intellect. No intermediate element interposes itself philo- 
sophically between the universal and the particular, no series 
of kinds or species, of generalia. Neither the artist who pro- 
duces art, nor the spectator who contemplates it, has need 
of anything but the universal and the individual, or, better, 
the universal individuated: the universal artistic activity, 
which is all contracted or concentrated in the representation 
of a single state of the soul. 
Nevertheless, if the pure artist and the pure critic, and also 
the pure philosopher, are not occupied with generalia, with 
classes or kinds, these retain their utility on other grounds; 
and this utility is the true side of those erroneous theories, 
which I will not leave without mention. I t  is certainly useful 
to construct a net of generalia, not for the production of art, 
whicl~ is spontaneous, nor for the judgment of it, which is 
philosophical, but to collect and to some extent circumscribe 
the infinite single intuitions, for the use of the attention and 
of memory, in order to group together to some extent the in- 
numerable particular works of art. These classes will always 
be formed, as is natural, either by means of the abstract im- 
agination or the abstract expression, and therefore as classes 
of states of the soul (literary and artistic kinds) and classes 
of means of expression (art), Nor does it avail to object here 
that the various kinds and arts are arbitrarily distinguished, 
and that the general dicllotomy is itself arbitrary; since it is 
admitted without difficulty that the procedure is certainly 
arbitrary, but the arbitrariness becomes innocuous and useful 
from the very fact that every pretension of being a philosoph- 
ical principle and criterion for the judgment of art is re- 
moved from it. Those kinds and classes render easy the 
knowledge of art and education in art, offering to the filest, 
as it were, an index of the most important works of art, to the 
second a collection of most important information suggested 
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by the practice of art, Evelytbing depends upon not con- 
founding hints with reality, and hypothetic warnings or im- 
peratives with categoric imperatives: a confusion which 
nlultiple and continuous temptations are certainly apt to in- 
duce, whence it is easy to be dominated by them, but not at 
all inevitable. Books of literary origin, rhetoric, grammar 
(with their divisions into parts of speech and their grammat- 
ical and syntactical laws), of the art of musical composition, 
of metre, of painting, and so on, contain the principal hints 
and collections of precepts. Tendencies toward a definite ex- 
pression of art are manifested in them either only in a sec- 
ondary manner,-and in this case it is art that is still abstract, 
art in elaboration (the poetic arts of classicism or romanti- 
cism, purist or popular grammars, etc.),-or as tendencies to- 
ward the philosophical comprehension of their argument, 
and then they give rise to the divisions into kinds and into 
arts, an essor which I have criticised: an ei-sor which, by its 
contradictions, opens the way to the tlve doctrine of the in- 
dividuality of art. 
Certainly this doctrine produces at first sight a sort of be- 
wilderment: individual, original, untranslatable, unclassifia- 
ble intuitions seem to escape the rule of thought, which 
would seem unable to dominate them without placing them 
in relation with one another; and this appears to be precisely 
forbidden by the doctrine that has been developed, which 
has rather the air of being anarchic or anarchoid than liberal 
and liberis tic. 
A little piece of poetry is =sthetically equal to a poem; a 
tiny little picture or a sketch, to an altar picture or an af- 
fresco; a letter is a work of art, no less than a romance; even 
a fine translation is as original as an original work! These 
propositions will be indubitable, because logically deduced 
from verified premises; they will be true, although (and this 
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is without doubt a merit) paradoxical, or at variance with 
vulgar opinions: but will they not be in want of some comple- 
ment? There must be some mode of arranging, subordinating, 
connecting, understanding, and dominating the dance of the 
intuitions, if we do not wish to bewilder our wits wit11 them. 
And there is indeed such a mode, for when we denied 
theoretic value to abstract classifications we did not intend 
to deny it to that genetic and concrete classification which is 
not, indeed, a "classification" and is called E7istot.y. In  history 
each work of art takes the place that belongs to it-that and 
no other: the ballade of Guido Cavalcanti and the sonnet of 
Cecco Angioleri, which seem to be the sigh or the laughter 
of an instant; the "Cominedia" of Dante, which seems to re- 
sume in itself a millennium of the human spirit; the "Mac- 
cheronee" of Merlin Cocaio at the close of the Middle Ages, 
with their noisy laughter; the elegant Cinquecento transla- 
tion of the Eneid by Annibal Caro; the dry prose of Sarpi; 
and the Jesuitic-polemical prose of Danielo Bartoli: without 
the necessity of judging that to be not original which is origi- 
nal, because it lives; that to be small which is neither great 
nor small, because it escapes measure: or we can say great and 
small, if we will, but metaphorically, with the intention of 
manifesting certain admirations and of noting certain rela- 
tions of importance (quite other than arithmetic or geomet- 
rical). And in history, which is ever becoming richer and 
more definite, not in pyramids of empirical concepts, which 
become more and more empty the higher they rise and the 
more subtle they become, is to be found the link of all worl~s 
of art and of all intuitions, because in history they appear 
organically connected among themselves, as successive and 
necessary stages of the development of the spirit, each one a 
note of the eternal poem which harrnonises all single poems 
in itself. 
THE PLACE OF ART IN THE SPIRIT AND 
IN HUMAN SOCIETY 
T HE dispute as to the dependence or independence of art was at its hottest in the romantic period, when the 
motto of "art for art's sake" was coined, and as its apparent 
antithesis that other of "art for life"; and from that time it 
was discussed, to tell the truth, rather among men of letters 
or artists than philosophers. I t  has lost interest in our day, 
fallen to the rank of a theme with which beginners amuse or 
exercise themselves, or of an argument for academic ora- 
tions. However, even previous to the romantic period, and 
indeed in the most ancient documents containing reflections 
upon art, are to be found traces of it; and philosophers of 
Zsthetic tl~emselves, even when they appear to neglect it 
(and they do indeed neglect it in its vulgar form), really do 
consider it, and indeed may be said to think of nothing else. 
Because, to dispute as to the dependence or the independ- 
ence, the autonomy or the heteronomy of art does not mean 
anything but to enquire whether art is or is not, and, if it is, 
what it is. An activity whose principle depends upon that of 
another activity is, effectively, that other activity, and re- 
tains for itself an existence that is only putative or conven- 
tional: art which depends upon morality, upon pleasure, or 
upon philosophy is morality, pleasure, or philosophy; it is not 
art. If it be held not to be dependent, it will be advisable to 
investigate the foundation of its independence-that is to say, 
how art is distinguished from morality, from pleasure, from 
philosoplly, and from all other things; what it is-and to posit 
whatever it may be as truly autonomous and independent. It 
may chance to be asserted, on the other hand, by those very 
people who affirm the concept of the original nature of art, 
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that although it preserve its peculiar nature, yet its place is 
below another activity of superior dignity, and (as used at 
one time to be said) that it is a handmaid to ethic, a minister 
to politics, and a dragoman to science; but this would only 
prove that there are people who have the habit of contra- 
dicting themselves or of allowing discord among their 
thoughts: dazed folk whose existence truly does not call for 
any sort of proof. For our part, we shall take care not to fall 
into so dazed a condition; and having already made clear 
that art is distinguished from the physical world and from 
the practical, moral, and conceptual activity as intuition, we 
shall give ourselves no further anxiety, and shall assume that 
with that first demonstration we have also demonstrated 
the independence of art. 
But another problem is implicit in the dispute as to de- 
pendence or independence; of this I have hitherto purpose- 
ly not spoken, and I shall now proceed to examine it. Inde- 
pendence is a concept of relation, and in this aspect the only 
absolute independence is the Absolute, or absolute relation; 
every particular form and concept is independent on one 
side and dependent on another, or both independent and de- 
pendent. Were this not so, the spirit, and reality in general, 
would be either a series of juxtaposed absolutes, or (which 
amounts to the same thing) a series of juxtaposed nullities. 
The independence of a form implies the matter to which it 
is applied, as we have already seen in the development of 
the genesis of art as an intuitive formation of a sentimental 
or passionate material; and in the case of absolute independ- 
ence, since all material and aliment would be wanting to it, 
form itself, being void, would become nullified. But since the 
recognised independence prevents our thinking one activity 
as submitted to the principle of another, the dependence 
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must be such as to guarantee the independence. But this 
would not be guaranteed in the hypothesis that one activity 
should be made to depend upon another, in the same way 
as that other upon it, like two forces which counterbalance 
each other, and of which the one does not conquer the other; 
because, if it do not conquer it, we have reciprocal arrest and 
static; if it conquer the other, pure and simple dependence, 
which has already been excluded. Hence, considering the 
matter in general, it appears that there is no other way of 
thinking the simultaneous independence and dependence of 
the various spiritual activities than that of conceiving them 
in tile relation of condition and conditioned, in which the 
conditioned surpasses the condition and presupposes it, and, 
becoming again in its turn condition, gives rise to a new con- 
ditioned, thus constituting a series of dezj.eloprnents. No 
other defect could be attributed to this series than that the 
first of the series would be a condition without a previous 
conditioned, and the last conditioned which would not be- 
come in its turn condition, thus causing a double rupture of 
the law of development itself. Even this defect is hezled if 
the last be made the condition of the first and the first the 
condition of the last; that is to say, if the series be conceived 
as reciprocal action, or better (and abandoning all natural- 
istic phraseology), as a circle. This conception seems to be 
the only way out of the difliculties with which the other con- 
ceptions of the spiritual life are striving, both that which 
makes it consist of an assemblage of independent and unre- 
lated faculties of the soul, or of independent and unrelated 
ideas of value, and that which subordinates all these in one 
and resolves them in that one, which remains immobile and 
impotent; or, more subtly, conceives them as necessary 
grades of a linear development which leads from an irration- 
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a1 first to a last that would wish to be most rational, but is, 
however, superrational, and as such also irrational. 
But it will be opportune not to insist upon this somewhat 
abstract scheme, and rather consider the manner in which it 
becomes actual in the life of the spirit, beginning with the 
zesthetic spirit. For this purpose we shall again return to the 
artist, or man-artist, who has achieved the process of libera- 
tion from the sentimental tumult and has objectified it in a 
lyrical image-that is, has attained to art. He finds his satis- 
faction in this image, because he has worked and moved in 
this direction: all know more or less the joy of the complete 
expression which we succeed in giving to our own psychical 
impulses, and the joy in those of others, which are also ours, 
when we contemplate the works of others, which are to some 
extent ours, and which we make ours. But is the satisfaction 
definite? Was only the man-artist impelled toward the im- 
age? Toward the image and toward another at the same 
time; toward the image in so far as he is man-artist, toward 
another in so far as he is artist-man; toward the image on the 
first plane, but, since the first plane is connected with the 
second and third planes, also toward the second and third, 
although immediately toward the first and mediately to- 
ward the second and third? And now that he  has reached 
the first plane, the second appears immediately behind it, 
and becomes a direct aim from indirect that it was before; 
and a new demand declares itself, a new process begins. Not, 
be it well observed, that the intuitive power gives place to 
another power, as though taking its turn of pleasure or of 
service; but the intuitive power itself-or, better, the spirit 
itself, which at first seemed to be, and in a certain sense was, 
all intuition-develops in itself the new process, which comes 
forth from the vitals of the first. "One soul is not kindled at 
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another" in us (I shall avail myself again on this occasion of 
Dante's words), but the one soul, which first is all collected 
in one single "virtue," and which "seems to obey no longer 
any power," satisfied in that virtue alone (in the artistic im- 
age), finds in that virtue, together with its satisfaction, its 
dissatisfaction: its satisfaction, because it gives to the soul all 
that it can give and is expected from it; its dissatisfaction, be- 
cause, having obtained all that, and having satiated the soul 
with its ultimate sweetness,-"what is asked and thanked for," 
-satisfaction is sought for the new need caused by the first 
satisfaction, which was not able to arise without that first 
satisfaction. And we all know also, from continual experience, 
the new want which lurks behind the formation of images. 
Ugo Foscolo has a love-affair with the Countess Arese; he 
knows with what sort of love and with what sort of woman 
he has to do, as can be proved from the letters he wrote, 
which are to be read in print. Nevertheless, during the mo- 
ments that he loves her, that woman is his universe, and he 
aspires to possess her as the highest beatitude, and in the 
enthusiasm of his admiration would render the mortal wo- 
man immortal, would transfigure this earthly creature into 
one divine for the time to come, achieving for her a new 
miracle of love. And indeed he already finds her rapt to the 
empyrean, an object of worship and of prayers: 
And thozc, divine one, living in  m y  hymns, 
Shalt receive the vows of my Insubrian descendants. 
The ode AZZ' amica risanata would not have taken shape in 
the spirit of Foscolo unless this metamorphosis of love had 
been desired and longed for with the greatest seriousness 
(lovers and even philosophers, if they have been in love, can 
witness that these absurdities are seriously desired); and the 
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images with which Foscolo represents the fascination of his 
goddess-friend, so rich in perils, would not have presented 
themselves so vividly and so spontaneously as they did. But 
what was that impetus of the soul which has now become a 
magnificent lyrical representation? Was all of Foscolo, the 
soldier, the patriot, the man of learning, moved with so many 
spiritual needs, expressed in that aspiration? Did it act so 
energetically within him as to be turned into action, and to 
some extent to give direction to his practical life? Foscolo, 
who had not been wanting of insight in the course of his love, 
as regards his poetry also from time to time became himself 
again when the creative tumult was appeased, and again 
acquired full clearness of vision. He asks himself what he 
really did will, and what the woman deserved. I t  may be 
that a slight suspicion of scepticism had insinuated itself dur- 
ing the formation of the image, if our ears be not deceived 
in seeming to detect here and there in the ode some trace of 
elegant irony toward the woman, and of the poet toward 
himself. This would not have happened in the case of a more 
ingenuous spirit, and the poetry would have flowed forth 
quite ingenuously. Foscolo the poet, having achieved his 
task and therefore being no longer poet, now wishes to know 
his real condition. He no longer forms the image, because he 
has formed it; he no longer fancies, but perceives and nar- 
rates ("that woman," he will say later of the "divine one," 
'%ad a piece of brain instead of a heart"); and the lyrical im- 
age changes, for him and for us, into an autobiographical ex- 
tract, or perception. 
With perception we have entered a new and very wide 
spiritual field; and, truly, words are not strong enough to 
satirise those thinkers who, now as in the past, confound 
image and perception, making of the image a perception (a 
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portrait or copy or imitation of nature, or history of the indi- 
vidual and of the times, etc.), and, worse still, of the percep- 
tion a kind of image apprehensible by the "senses." But per- 
ception is neither more nor less than a complete judgment, 
and as judgment implies an image and a category or system 
of mental categories which must dominate the image (re- 
ality, quality, etc.); and in respect of the image, or a priori 
zsthetic synthesis of feeling and fancy (intuition), it is a new 
synthesis, of representation and category, of subject and 
predicate, the a pri01.i logical synthesis, of which it would be 
fitting to repeat all that has been said of tbe other, and, above 
all, that in it content and form, representation and category, 
subject and predicate, do not appear as two elements united 
by a third, but the representation appears as category, the 
category as representation, in indivisible unity: the subject is 
subject only in the predicate, and the predicate is predicate 
only in the subject. Nor is perception a logical act among 
other logical acts, or the most rudimentary and imperfect of 
them; for he who is able to extract from it all the treasures it 
contains would have no need to seek beyond it for other de- 
terminations of logicity, because consciousness of what has 
really happened, which in its eminently literary forms takes 
the name of histoly, and consciousness of the universal, 
which in its eminent forms takes the name of system or phi- 
losophy, spring from perception, which is itself this synthetic 
gemination: and philosophy and history constitute the supe- 
rior unity, which philosophers have discovered, for no other 
reason than the synthetic connection of the perceptive judg- 
ment, whence they are born and in which they live, identify- 
ing philosopl~y and history, and which men of good sense 
discover in their own way, though they always observe that 
ideas suspended in air are phantoms, are facts which occur 
58 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
-real facts-what alone is true, and alone worthy of being 
known. Finally, perception (the variety of perceptions) ex- 
plains why the human intellect strives to emerge from them 
and to impose upon them a world of types and of laws, gov- 
erned by mathematical measures and relations; which is the 
reason of the formation of the natural sciences and mathe- 
matics, in addition to philosopl~y and history. 
It is not here my task to give a sketch of Logic, as I have 
been or am giving a sketch of Bsthetic; and therefore, re- 
fraining from determining and developing the theory of 
Logic, and intellectual, perceptive, and historical knowl- 
edge, I shall resume the thread of the argument, not pro- 
ceeding on this occasion from the artistic and intuitive spirit, 
but Erom the logical and historical, which has surpassed the 
intuitive and has elaborated the image in perception. Does 
the spirit find satisfaction in this form? Certainly: all Iaow 
the very lively satisfactions of knowledge and science; all 
know, from experience, the desire which takes possession of 
one to discover the countenance of reality, concealed by our 
illusions; and even though that countenance be terrible, the 
discovery is never unaccompanied with profound pleasure, 
due to the satisfaction of possessing the truth. But does such 
satisfaction differ in being complete and final from that af- 
forded by art? Does not dissatisfaction perhaps appear side 
by side with the satisfaction of knowing reality? This, too, 
is most certain; and the dissatisfaction of having known man- 
ifests itself (as indeed all know by experience) in the desire 
for action: it is well to know the real state of affairs, but we 
must know it in order to act; by all means let us know the 
world, but in order that we may change it: tempus cogno- 
scendi, tempus destruendi, tempus reno-t.andi. No man re- 
mains stationary in knowledge, not even sceptics or pessi- 
T h e  Breviary of Aesthetic 59 
mists who, in consequence of that knowledge, assume this or 
that attitude, adopt this or that form of life. And that very 
fixing of acquired knowledge, that "retaining after "under- 
standing," without which (still quoting Dante) "there can 
be no science," the formation of types and laws and criteria 
of measurement, the natural sciences and mathematics, to 
which I have just referred, were a surpassing of the act of 
theory by proceeding to the act of action. And not only does 
everyone know from experience, and can always verify by 
comparison with facts, that this is indeed so; but on consider- 
ation, it is evident that things could not proceed othenvise. 
There was a time (which still exists for not a few uncon- 
scious Platonicians, mystics, and ascetics) when it was be- 
lieved that to know was to elevate the soul to a god, to an 
Idea, to a world of ideas, to an Absolute placed above the 
phenomenal human world; and it was natural that when the 
soul, becoming estranged from itself by an effort against na- 
ture, Bad attained to that superior sphere, it retui-ned con- 
founded to earth, where it could remain perpetually happy 
and inactive. That thought, which was no longer thought, 
had for counterpoise a reality that was not reality. But since 
(with Vico, Kant, Hegel, and other heresiarchs) knowledge 
has descended to earth, and is no longer conceived as a more 
or less pallid copy of an immobile reality, but remains always 
human, and produces, not abstract ideas, but concrete con- 
cepts which are syllogisms and historical judgments, percep- 
tions of the reaI, the practical is no longer something that 
represents a degeneration of knowledge, a second fall from 
heaven to earth, or from paradise to hell, nor something that 
can be resolved upon or abstained from, but is implied in 
theory itself, as a demand of theory; and as the theory, so the 
practice. Our thought is historical thought of a historical 
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world, a process of development of a development; and 
hardly has a qualification of reality been pronounced, when 
the quali6cation is already of no value, because it has itself 
produced a new reality, which awaits a new qualification. A 
new reality, which is economic and moral life, turns the in- 
tellectual into the practical man, the politician, the saint, the 
man of business, the hero, and elaborates the a p~*iori logical 
synthesis into the practical a p.t.iori synthesis; but this is nev- 
ertheless always a new feeling, a new desiring, a new will- 
ing, a new passionality, in which the spirit can never rest, 
and solicits above all as new material a new intuition, a new 
lyricism, a new art. 
And thus the last term of the series reunites itself (as I 
stated at the beginning) with the first term, the circle is 
closed, and the passage begins again: a passage which is a 
return of that already made, whence the Vichian concept ex- 
pressed in the word 'i.eturn," now become classic. But the 
development which I have described explains the independ- 
ence of art, and also the reasons for its apparent dependence, 
in the eyes of those who have conceived erroneous doctrines 
(hedonistic, moralistic, conceptualistic, etc.), which I have 
criticised above, though noting, in the course of criticism, 
that in each one of them could be found some reference to 
truth. If it be asked, which of the various activities of the 
spirit is real, or if they be all real, we must reply that none of 
them is real; because the only reality is the activity of all 
these activities, which does not reside in any one of them in 
pai-ticular: of the various syntheses that we have one after 
the other distinguished,-=sthetic synthesis, logical synthe- 
sis, practical synthesis,-the only real one is the synthesis of 
syntheses, the Spirit, which is the true Absolute, the actus 
purus. But from another point of view, and for the same rea- 
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son, all are real, in the unity of the spirit, in the eternal going 
and coming, which is their eternal constancy and reality. 
Those who see in art the concept, history, mathematics, the 
type, morality, pleasure, and everything else, are right, be- 
cause these and all other things are contained within it, ow- 
ing to the unity of the spirit; indeed, the presence in it of 
them all, and the energetic unilaterality alike of art as of any 
other particular form, tending to reduce all activities to one, 
explains the passage from one form to another, the complet- 
ing of one form in the other, and it explains development. 
But those same people are wrong (owing to the distinction, 
which is the inseparable moment of unity) in the way that 
they find them all equally abstract or equally confused. Be- 
cause concept, type, number, measure, morality, utility, 
pleasure and pain are in art as art, either antecedent or con- 
sequent; and therefore are there presupposed (sunk and for- 
gotten there, to adopt a favourite expression of De Sanctis) 
or as presentiments. Without that presumption, without that 
presentiment, art would not be art; but it would not be art 
either (and all the other forms of the spirit would be dis- 
turbed by it), if it were desired to impose those values upon 
art as art, which is and never can be other than pure intui- 
tion. The artist will always be morally blameless and philo- 
sophically uncensurable, even though his art should indicate 
a low morality and philosophy: in so far as he is an artist, he 
does not act and does not reason, but poetises, paints, sings 
and, in short, expresses himself: were we to adopt a different 
criterion, we should return to the condemnation of Homeric 
poetry, in the manner of the Italian critics of the Seicento 
and the French critics of the time of the fourteenth Louis, 
who turned up their noses at  what they termed "the man- 
ners" of those inebriated, vociferating, violent, cruel and ill- 
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educated heroes. The criticism of the philosophy underlying 
Dante's poem is certainly possible, but that criticism will en- 
ter the subterranean parts of the art of Dante as though by 
undermining, and will leave intact the soil on the surface, 
which is the art; Nicholas Macchiavelli will be able to de- 
stroy the Dantesque political ideal, recommending neither 
an emperor nor an international pope as greyhound of libera- 
tion, but a tyrant or a national prince; but he will not have 
eradicated that aspiration from Dante's poem. In lilte man- 
ner, it may be advisable not to show and not to permit to boys 
and young men the reading of certain pictures, romances, 
and plays; but this recommendation and act of forbidding 
will be limited to the practical sphere and will affect, not the 
works of art, but the books and canvases which serve as in- 
struments for the reproduction of the art, which, as practical 
works, paid for in the market at a price equivalent to so much 
corn or gold, can also themselves be shut up in a cabinet or 
cupboard, and even be burnt in a "pyre of vanities," ri la Sa- 
vonarola. To confound the various phases of development in 
an ill-understood impulse for unity, to make morality domi- 
nate art, when and so far as art surpasses morality, or art 
dominate science, when and so far as science dominates or 
surpasses art, or has already been itself dominated and sur- 
passed by life: this is what unity well understood which is 
also rigorous distinction, should prevent and reject. 
And it should prevent and reject it also, because the estab- 
lished order of the various stages of the circle makes it pos- 
sible to understand not only the independence and the de- 
pendence of the various forms of the spirit, but also the 
preservation of this order of the one in the other. It is well 
to mention one of the problems which present themselves in 
this place, or rather to return to it, for I have already referred 
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to it fugitively: the relation between fancy and logic, art and 
science. This problem is substantially the same as that which 
reappears as the search for the distinction between poetry 
and prose; at any rate, since (and the discovery was soon 
made, for it is already found in the "Poetic" of Aristotle) it 
was recognised that the distinction cannot be drawn as be- 
tween the metrical and the unmetrical, since there can be 
poetry in prose (for example, romances and plays) and 
prose in metre (for example, didascalic and philosophic 
poems). We shall therefore conduct it with the more pro- 
found criteiion, which is that of image and perception, of 
intuition and judgment, which has already been explained; 
poetry will be the expression of the image, prose that of the 
judgment or concept, But the two expressions, in so far as 
expressions, are of the same nature, and both possess the 
same zesthetic value; therefore, if the poet be the lyrist of his 
feelings, the prosaist is also the lyrist of his feelings,-that is, 
poet,-though it be of the feelings which arise in him from 
or in his search for the concept, And there is no reason what- 
ever for recognising the quality of poet to the composer of a 
sonnet and of refusing it to him who has composed the 
"Metaphysic," the "Somma Teologia," the "Scienza Nuova," 
the 'Phenomenology of the Spirit," or told the story of the 
Peloponnesian wars, of the politics of Augustus and Tiberius, 
or the "universal history": in all of those works there is as 
much passion and as much lyrical and representative force 
as in any sonnet or poem. For all the distinctions with which 
it has been attempted to reserve the poetic quality for the 
poet and to deny it to the prosaist, are like those stones, car- 
ried with great effort to the top of a steep mountain, which 
fall back again into the valley with ruinous results. Yet there 
is a just apparent digerence, but in order to determine it, 
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poetry and prose must not be separated in the manner of 
naturalistic logic, like two co-ordinated concepts simply op- 
posed the one to the other: we must conceive them in devel- 
opment as a passage from poetry to prose. And since the 
poet, in this passage, not only presupposes a passionate ma- 
terial, owing to the unity of the spirit, but preserves the pas- 
sionality and elevates it to the passionality of a poet (passion 
for art), so the thinker or prosaist not only preserves that 
passionality and elevates it to a passionality for science, but 
also preserves the intuitive force, owing to which his judg- 
ments come forth expressed together with the passionality 
that surrounds them, and therefore they retain their artistic 
as well as their scientific character. We can always contem- 
plate this artistic character, assuming its scientific character, 
or separating it therefrom and from the criticism of science, 
in order to enjoy the zesthetic form which it has assumed; 
and this is also the reason why science belongs, tliough in 
different aspects, to the history of science and to the history 
of literature, and why, among the many different kinds of 
poetry enumerated by the rhetoricians, it would at the least 
be capricious to refuse to number the " p o e ~  of prose," 
which is sometimes far purer poetry than much pretentious 
poetry of poetry. And it will be well that I should mention 
again a new problem of the same sort, to which I have al- 
ready alluded in passing: namely, the connection between 
art and morality, which has been denied to be immediate 
identification of the one with the other, but which must now 
be reasserted, and to note that, since the poet preserves the 
passion for his art when free from every other passionality, 
so he preserves in his art the consciousness of duty (duty 
toward art), and every poet, in the act of creation, is moral, 
because he accompIishes a sacred function. 
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And finally, the order and logic of the various forms of 
the spirit, making the one necessary for the other and there- 
fore all necessary, reveal the folly of negating the one in the 
name of the other: the error of the philosopher (Plato), or 
of the moralist (Savonarola or Proudhon), or of the natural- 
ist and practical man (there are so many of these that I do 
not quote names!), who refute art and poetry; and, on the 
other hand, the error of the artist who rebels against thought, 
science, practice, and morality, as did so many 'i-omantics" 
in tragedy, and as do so many "decadents" in comedy in our 
day. These are errors and follies to which also we can afford 
a caress in passing (always keeping in view our plan of not 
leaving anyone quite disconsolate), for it is evident that they 
have a positive content of their own in their very negativity, 
as rebellion against certain false concepts or certain false 
manifestations of art and of science, of practice and of mo- 
rality (Plato, for example, combating the idea of poetry as 
"wisdom"; Savonarola, the not austere and therefore corrupt 
civilisation of the Italian Renaissance so soon to be dis- 
solved), etc. But it is madness to attempt to prove that were 
philosophy without art, it would exist for itself, because it 
would be without what conditions its problems, and air to 
breathe would be taken from it, in order to make it prevail. 
alone against art; and that practice is not practice, when it 
is not set in motion and revived by aspirations, and, as they 
say, by "ideals," by "dear imagining," which is art; and, on 
the other hand, that art without morality, art that usurps 
with the decadents the title of "pure beauty," and before 
which is burnt incense, as though it were a diabolic idol wor- 
shipped by a company of devils, owing to the lack of morali- 
ty in the life from which it springs and which surrounds it, is 
decomposed as art, and become caprice, luxury, and charla- 
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tanry; the artist no longer serves it, but it serves the private 
and futile interests of the artist as the vilest of slaves. 
Nevertheless, objection has been taken to the idea of the 
circle in general, which affords so much aid in making clear 
the connection of dependence and independence of art and 
of the other spiritual forms, on the gsound that it thinks the 
work of the spirit as a tiresome and melancl~oly doing and 
undoing, a monotonous turning upon itself, not worth the 
trouble of effecting, Certainly there is no metaphor but 
leaves some side open to parody and caricature; but these, 
when they have gladdened us for a moment, oblige us to 
return seriously to the thought expressed in the metaphor. 
And the thought is not that of a sterile repetition of going 
and coming, but a continuous enrichment in the going of the 
going and coming of the coming. The last tern, which again 
becomes the first, is not the old first, but presents itseIf with 
a multiplicity and precision of concepts, with an experience 
of life lived, and even of works contemplated, which was 
wanting to the old first term; and it affords material for a 
more lofty, more refined, more complex and more mature 
art. Thus, instead of being a perpetually even revolution, 
the idea of the circle is nothing but the true philosophical 
idea of progress, of the perpetual growth of the spirit and of 
reality in itself, where nothing is repeated, save the fonn of 
the growth; unless it should be objected to a man walking, 
that his walking is a standing still, because he always moves 
his legs in the same time! 
Another objection, or rather another movement of rebel- 
lion against the same idea, is frequently to be observed, 
though not clearly self-conscious: the restlessness, existing 
in some or several, the endeavour to break and to surpass 
the circularity that is a law of life, and to attain to a region 
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of repose from movement, so full of anxiety; withdrawn 
henceforward from the ocean and standing upon the shore, 
to turn back and contemplate the tossing billows, But I have 
already had occasion to state of what this repose consists: an 
effectual negation of reality, beneath the appearance of ele- 
vation and sublimation; and it is certainly attained, but is 
called death; the death of the individual, not of reality, 
which does not die, and is not af3icted by its own motion, 
but enjoys it. Others dream of a spiritual form, in which the 
circle is dissolved, a form which should be Thought of 
thought, unity of the Theoretical and of the Practical, Love, 
God, or whatever other name it may bear; they fail to per- 
ceive that this thought, this unity, this Love, this God, al- 
ready exists in and for the circle, and that they are uselessly 
repeating a search already completed, or are repeating 
metaphorically what has already been discovered, in the 
myth of another world, where the very drama of the only 
world should be repeated. 
I have hitherto outlined this drama, as it truly is, ideal and 
extratemporal, employing such telms as first and second, 
solely with a view to verbal convenience and in order to in- 
dicate logical order:-ideal and extratemporal, because there 
is not a monlent and there is not an individual in whom it is 
not all performed, as there is no particle of the universe un- 
breathed upon by the Spirit of God. But the ideal, indivisible 
moments of the ideal drama can be seen as if divided in em- 
pirical reality, like an impure and embodied symbol of the 
ideal distinction. Not that they are really divided (ideality 
is the true reality), but they appear to be so empirically to 
him who looks upon them with a view to classification, for 
he possesses no other way of determini~g in the types the 
individuality of the facts that have attracted his attention, 
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save that of enlarging and of exaggerating ideal distinctions. 
Thus the artist, the philosopher, the historain, the naturalist, 
the mathematician, the man of business, the good man, seem 
to live separated from one another; and the spheres of artis- 
tic, phiIosophica1, historical, naturalistic, mathematical cul- 
ture, and those of economic and ethic and of the many in- 
stitutions connected with them, to be distinct from one an- 
other; and finally, the life of humanity is divided into epochs 
in the ages, in which one or the other or only some of the 
idea1 forms are represented: epochs of fancy, of religion, of 
speculation, of natural sciences, of industrialism, of political 
passions, of moral enthusiasms, of pleasure seeking, and so 
on; and these epochs have their more or less perfect goings 
and comings. But the eye of the historian discovers the per- 
petual difference in the uniformity of individuals, of classes, 
and of epochs; and the philosophical consciousness, unity in 
difference; and the philosopher-historian sees ideal progress 
and unity, as also historical progress, in that difference. 
But let us, too, speak as empiricists for a moment (so that 
since empiricism exists it may be of some use), and let us 
ask ourselves to which of the specimens belongs our epoch 
or that from which we have just emerged; what is its pre- 
vailing characteristic? To this there will be an immediate 
and universal reply that it is and has been naturalistic in cul- 
ture, industrial in practice; and philosophical greatness and 
artistic greatness will at the same time both be denied to it. 
But since (and here empiricism is already in danger) no 
epoch can live without philosophy and without art, our 
epoch, too, has possessed both, so far as it was capable of 
possessing them. And its philosophy and its art-the former 
mediately, the latter immediately-find their places in 
thought, as documents of what our epoch has truly been in 
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its complexity and interests; by interpreting these, we shall 
be able to clear the ground upon which must arise our duty. 
Contemporary art, sensual, insatiable in its desire for en- 
joyments, furrowed with turbid attempts at an ill-under- 
stood aristocracy, which reveals itself as a voluptuous idea1 
or an ideal of arrogance and of cruelty, sometimes sighing 
for a mysticism which is also egoistic and voluptuous, with- 
out faith in God and without faith in thought, incredulous 
and pessimistic,-and often very powerful in its rendering of 
such states of the soul: this art,-vainly condemned by mor- 
alists,-when understood in its profound motives and in its 
genesis, asks for action, which will certainly not be directed 
toward condemning, repressing, or rearranging art, but to- 
ward directing life more energetically toward a more healthy 
and more profound morality, which will be mother of a no- 
bler art, and, I: would also say, of a nobler philosophy. A 
more noble philosophy than that of our epoch, incapable of 
accounting not only for religion, for science, and for itself, 
but for art itself, which has again become a profound mys- 
tery, or rather a theme for horrible blunders by positivists, 
neocriticists, psychologists, and pragmatists, who have 
hitherto represented contemporary philosophy, and have 
relapsed (perhaps in order to acquire new strength and to 
mature new problems!) into the most childish and most 
crude conceptions of art. 
IV 
CRITICISM AND THE HISTORY OF ART 
RTISTIC and literary criticism is often looked upon by A artists as a morose and tyrannical pedagogue who 
gives capricious orders, imposes prohibitions, and grants per- 
missions, thus aiding or injuring their works by wilfully de- 
ciding upon their fate. And so the artists either shew them- 
selves submissive, humble, flattering, adulatory, toward it, 
while hating it in their hearts; or, when they do not obtain 
what they want, or their loftiness of soul forbids that they 
should descend to those arts of the courtier, they revolt 
against it, proclaiming its uselessness, with imprecations and 
mockery, comparing (the remembrance is personal) the 
critic to an ass that enters the potter's shop and breaks in 
pieces with qnadrupedante ungulz  t?onitu the delicate prod- 
ucts of his art set out to dry in the sun. This time, to tell the 
truth, it is the artists' fault, for they do not know what criti- 
cism is, expecting from it favours which it  is not in a position 
to grant, and injuries which it is not in a position to inflict: 
since it is clear that since no critic can make an artist of one 
who is not an artist, so no critic can ever undo, overthrow, 
or even slightly injure an artist who is really an artist, owing 
to the metaphysical impossibility of such an act: these things 
have never happened in the course of history, they do not 
happen in our day, and we can be sure that they will never 
happen in the future. But sometimes it is the critics them- 
selves, or the self-styled critics, who do actually present 
themselves as pedagogues, as oracles, as guides of art, as 
IegisIators, seers, and prophets; they command artists to do 
this or that, they assign themes to them and declare that cer- 
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tain subjects are poetical, and certain others not; they are 
discontented with the art at present produced, and would 
prefer one similar to that prevailing at this or that epoch of 
the past, or at another of which they declare they catch a 
glimpse in the near or remote future; they will reprove Tasso 
for not being Ariosto, Leopardi for not being Metastasio, 
Manzoni for not being Mer i ,  D'Annunzio because he is not 
Berchet or Fra Jacopone; and they describe the great artist 
of the future, supplying him with ethic, philosophy, history, 
language, metric, with architectonic and colouristic proc- 
esses, and with whatever it may seem to them that he stands 
in need. And this time it is clear that the blame lies with the 
critic; and the artists are right in behaving toward such bru- 
tality in the way that we behave toward beasts, which we 
try to tame, to illude and to delude, in order that they may 
serve us; or we drive them away and send them to the 
slaughter-house when they are no longer good for any ser- 
ice. But for the honour of criticism we must add that those 
capricious critics are not so much critics as artists: artists who 
have failed and who aspire to a certain form of art, which 
they are unable to attain, either because their aspiration was 
contradictory, or because their power was not s ac i en t  and 
failed them; and thus, preserving in their soul the bitterness 
of the unrealised ideal, they can speak of nothing else, la- 
menting everywhere its absence, and everywhere invoking 
its presence. And sometimes, too, they are artists who are 
anything but failures,-indeed, most felicitous artists,-but, 
owing to the very energy of their artistic individuality, in- 
capable of emerging from themselves in order to understand 
forms of art different from their own, and disposed to reject 
them with violence; they are aided in this negation by the 
oclium figulinum, the jealousy of the artist for the artist, 
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which is without doubt a defect, but one with which too 
many excellent artists appear to be stained for us to refuse 
to it some indulgence similar to that accorded to the defects 
of women, so difficult, as we know, to separate from their 
good qualities. Other artists should calmly reply to these 
artist-critics "continue doing in your art what you do so well, 
and let us do what we can do"; and to the artists who have 
failed and improvised themselves critics: "Do not claim that 
we should do what you have failed in doing, or what is work 
of the future, of which neither you nor we know anything." 
As a fact, this is not the usual reply, because passion forms 
half of it; but this is indeed the logical reply, which logically 
terminates the question, though we must foresee that the 
altercation will not terminate, but will indeed last as long as 
there are intolerant artists and failures-that is to say, for 
ever. 
And there is another conception of criticism, which is ex- 
pressed in the magistrate and in the judge, as the foregoing 
is expressed in the pedagogue or in the tyrant; it attributes 
to criticism the duty, not of promoting and guiding the Me 
of art,-which is promoted and guided, if you like to call it 
so, only by history; that is, by the complex movement of the 
spirit in its historical course,-but simply to separate, in the 
art which has already been produced, the beautiful from the 
ugly, and to approve the beautiful and reprove the ugly with 
the solemnity of a properly austere and conscientious sen- 
tence. But I fear that the blame of uselessness will not be 
removed from criticism, even with this other definition, al- 
though perhaps the motive of this blame may to some ex- 
tent be changed. Is there really need of criticism in order to 
distinguish the beautiful from the ugly? The production it- 
self of art is never anything but this distinguishing, because 
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the artist arrives at purity of expression precisely by elimi- 
nating the ugly which menaces to invade it; and this ugliness 
is his tumultuous human passions striving against the pure 
passion of art: his weaknesses, his prejudices, his conven- 
ience, his Zuissex faire, his haste, his having one eye on art 
and another on the spectator, on the editor, on the irnpre- 
sario-all of them things that impede the artist in the phys- 
iological bearing and normal birth of his image-expression, 
the poet of the verse that rings and creates, the painter of 
sure drawing and harmonious colour, the composer of mel- 
ody, and introduces into their work, if care be not taken to 
defend themselves against it, sonorous and empty verses, in- 
corrections, lack of harmony, discordances. And since the 
artist, at the moment of producing, is a very severe judge of 
himself from whom nothing escapes,-not even that which 
escapes others,-others also discern, immediately and very 
clearly, in the spontaneity of contemplation, where the artist 
has been an artist and where he has been a man, a poor man; 
in what works, or in what parts of works, lyrical enthusiasm 
and creative fancy reign supreme, and in what they have 
become chilled and have yielded their place to other things, 
which pretend to be art, and therefore (considered from 
the aspect of this pretence) are called "ugly." What is the 
use of the sentence of criticism, when the sentence has al- 
ready been given by genius and by taste? Genius and taste 
are legion, they are people, they are general and secular con- 
sensus of opinion. So true is this, that the sentences of criti- 
cism are always given too late; they consecrate forms that 
have already been solemnly consecrated with universal ap- 
plause (pure applause must not, however, be confounded 
with the clapping of hands and with social notoriety, the 
constancy of gloiy with the caducity of fortune), they con- 
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demn ugliness already condemned, grown wearisome and 
forgotten, or still praised in words, but with a bad conscience, 
through prejudice and obstinate pride. Criticism, conceived 
as a magistrate, kills the dead or blows air upon the face of 
the living, who is quite lively, in the belief that its breath is 
that of the God who brings life; that is, it performs a useless 
task, because this has previously been performed. I ask my- 
self what critics have established the greatness of Dante, of 
Shakespeare, or of Michelangelo: if, among the legions who 
have acclaimed and do acclaim these great men, there are 
or have been men of letters and professional critics, their 
acclamation does not differ in this case from that of youth 
and of the people, who are all equally ready to open their 
hearts to the beautiful, which speaks to all, save sometimes, 
when it is silent, on discovering the surly countenance of a 
critic-judge. 
And so there arises a third conception of criticism: the 
criticism of interpretation or comment, which makes itself 
small before works of art and limits itself to the duty of dust- 
ing, placing in a good light, furnishing information as to the 
period at which a picture was painted and what it repre- 
sents, explaining linguistic forms, historical allusions, the pre- 
sumptions of fact and of idea in a poem; and in both cases, 
its duty performed, permits the art to act spontaneousIy 
within the soul of the onlooker and of the reader, who will 
then judge of it according as his intimate taste tells him to 
judge. In this case the critic appears as a cultivated cicerone 
or as a patient and discreet schoolmaster: 'Criticism is the 
art of teaching to read," is the definition of a famous critic; 
and the definition has not been without its echo. Now no one 
contests the utility of guides to museums or exhibitions, or of 
teachers of reading, still less of erudite guides and masters 
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who know so many things hidden from the majority and are 
able to throw so much light on subjects. Not only has the art 
that is most remote from us need of this assistance, but also 
that of the nearest past, called contemporary, which, al- 
though it treats of subjects and presents forms that seem to 
be obvious, is yet not always sufficiently obvious; and some- 
times a great effort is requisite in order to prepare people to 
feel the beauty of a little poem or of some work of art, though 
born but yesterday. Prejudices, habits and forgetfulness form 
hedges barring the approach to that work: the expert hand 
of the interpreter and of the commentator is required to re- 
move them. Criticism in this sense is certainly most useful, 
but we do not see why it should be called criticism when 
that sort of work already possesses its own name of interpre- 
tation, comment, or exegesis. To call this criticism is at best 
useless, for it is equivocal. 
I t  is equivocal because criticism demands to be, wishes to 
be and is something difFerent: it does not wish to invade art, 
nor to rediscover the beauty of the beautiful, or the ugliness 
of the ugly, nor to make itself small before art, but rather to 
make itself great before art which is great and, in a certain 
sense, above it. What, then, is legitimate and true criticism? 
First of all, it is at once all three of the things that I have 
hitherto explained; that is to say, all these three things are 
its necessary conditions, without which it would not arise. 
Without the moment of art (and, as we have seen, that criti- 
cism which affirms itself to be productive or an aid to pro- 
duction, or as repressing certain forms of production to the 
advantage of certain other forms, is, in a certain sense, art 
against art), the experience of art would be wanting to the 
critic, art created within his spirit, severed from non-art, and 
enjoyed in preference to that. And finally, this experience 
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would be wanting without exegesis, without the removal of 
the obstacles to reproductive fancy, which supply the spirit 
with those presumptions of historical knowledge of which it 
has need, and which are the wood to burn in the fire of fancy, 
But here, before going further, it will be well to resolve a 
grave doubt which has been agitated and is still agitated, 
both in philosophical literature and in ordinary thought, and 
which certainly, where justified, would not only compromise 
the possibility of criticism, of which I am discoursing, but 
also of reproductive fancy itself, or taste. Is it truly possible 
to collect, as does exegesis, the materials required for repro- 
ducing the work of art of others (or our own past work of 
art, when we search our memory and consult our papers in 
order to remember what we were when we produced it), 
and to reproduce that work of art in our fancy in its genuine 
features? Can the collection of the material required be ever 
complete? And however complete it be, will the fancy ever 
permit itself to be chained by it in its labour of reproduction? 
Will it not act as a new fancy, introducing new material? 
Will it not be obliged to do so, owing to its impotence truly 
to reproduce the other and the past? Is the reproduction of 
the individual, of the individuum inefabile, conceivable, 
when every sane philosophy teaches that the universal alone 
is eternally reproducible? Will not the reproduction of the 
works of art of others or of the past be consequently a simple 
impossibility; and will not what is usually alleged as an un- 
disputed fact in ordinary conversation, and is the expressed 
or implied presupposition in every dispute upon art, be 
perhaps (as was said of history in general) une fable con- 
venue? 
Truly, when we consider the problem rather from with- 
out, it will seem most improbable that the firm belief which 
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all possess in the comprehension and intelligence of art is 
without foundation,-all the more, if we observe that these 
very people who deny the possibility of reproductions in 
abstract theory-or, as they call it, the absoluteness of taste 
-are yet most tenacious in maintaining their own judgments 
of taste, and very clearly realise the difference there is be- 
tween the affirmation that wine pleases or displeases me be- 
cause it agrees or disagrees with my physiological organism, 
and the affirmation that a poem is beautiful, and another a 
pastiche: the second order of judgments (as Kant shows in 
a classical analysis) carries with it the uncoercible preten- 
sion to universal validity; souls become passionate about it; 
and in days of chivalry there were even those who main- 
tained the beauty of the "Gerusalemme," sword in hand, 
whereas no one that we know has ever been killed maintain- 
ing, sword in hand, that wine was pleasant or unpleasant. 
To object that works artistically base have yet pleased many 
or someone, and if not others, their author, is not valid, be- 
cause their having pleased is not set in doubt (since nothing 
can be born in the soul without the consent of the soul, and 
consequently without a correlative pleasure); but it is 
doubted whether that pleasure were =sthetic, and were 
founded upon a judgment of taste and beauty. And passing 
from extrinsic scepticism to intrinsic consideration, i t  should 
be said that the objection of the conceivability of the ~s the t i c  
reproduction is founded upon a reality conceived in its turn 
as a shock of atoms, or as abstractly monadistic, composed 
of monads without communication among themselves and 
harmonised only from without. But that is not reality: reality 
is spiritual unity, and in spiritud unity nothing is lost, every- 
thing is an eternal possession. Not only the reproduction of 
art, but, in general, the memory of any fact (which is indeed 
78 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
always reproduction of intuitions), would be inconceivable 
without the unity of the real; and if we had not been our- 
selves Caesar and Pompey,-that is, that universal which was 
once determined as Caesar and Pompey and is now deter- 
mined as ourselves, they living in us,-we should be unable 
to form any idea of Caesar and Pompey. And further, the 
doctrine that individuality is irreproducible and the univer- 
sal only reproducible is certainly a doctrine of "sound" phi- 
losophy, but of sound scholastic philosophy, which separated 
universal and individual, making the latter an accident of 
the former (dust carried along by time), and did not know 
that the true universal is the universal individuated, and 
that the only true effable is the so-called ineffable, the con- 
crete and individual. And finally, what does it matter if we 
have not always ready the material for reproducing with 
full exactitude all works of art or any work of art of the past? 
Fully exact reproduction is, like every human work, an ideal 
which is realised in infinity, and therefore is always realised 
in such a manner that it is admitted at every instant of time 
by the conformation of reality. Is there a suggestion in a 
poem of which the full signification escapes us? No one will 
wish to affirm that that suggestion, of which we now have a 
crepuscular vision that fails to satisfy, will not be better de- 
termined in the future by means of research and meditation 
and by the formation of favourable conditions and syrn- 
pathetic currents. 
Therefore, inasmuch as taste is most sure of the legitimacy 
of its discussions, by just so much is historical research and 
interpretation indefatigable in restoring and preserving and 
widening the knowledge of the past; not mentioning that 
relativists and sceptics, both in taste and in history, utter 
their desperate cries from time to time, which do not reduce 
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anyone, not even themselves, as we have seen, to the effec- 
tual desperation of not judging. 
Closing here this long but indispensable parenthesis and 
taking up the thread of the discourse, art, historical exegesis, 
and taste, if they be conditions of criticism, are not yet criti- 
cism. Indeed, nothing is obtained by means of that triple 
presupposition, save the reproduction and enjoyment of the 
image-expression; that is to say, we return and place our- 
selves neither more nor less than in the place of the artist- 
producer in the act of producing his image. Nor can we es- 
cape from those conditions, as some boast of doing, by pro- 
posing to ourselves to reproduce in a new form the work of 
the poet and the artist by providing its equivalent; hence 
they define the critic: artifex additus adifici. Because that re- 
production in a new garment would be a translation, or a 
variation, another work of art, to  some extent inspired by the 
first; and if it were the same, it would be a reproduction 
pure and simple, a material reproduction, with the same 
words, the same colours, and the same tones-that is, useless. 
The critic is not artifex additus artifici, but philosophus ad- 
ditzls artifici: his work is not achieved, save when the image 
received is both preserved and surpassed; it belongs to 
thought, which we have seen surpass and illumine fancy 
with new light, make the intuition perception, qualify reality, 
and therefore distinguish reality from unreality. In this per- 
ception, this distinction, which is always and altogether criti- 
cism or judgment, the criticism of art, of which we are now 
especially treating, originates wit11 the question: whether 
and in what measure the fact, which we have before us as a 
problem, is intuition-that is to say, is real as such; and 
whether and in what measure, it is not such-that is to say, 
is unreal: reality and unreality, which in art are called beauty 
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and ugliness, as in logic they are called truth and error, in 
economy gain and loss, in ethic good and eviI. Thus the 
whole criticism of art can be reduced to this briefest proposi- 
tion, which further serves to differentiate its work from that 
of art and taste (which, considered in themselves, are logi- 
cally mute), and from exegetical erudition (which lacks logi- 
cal synthesis, and is therefore also logically mute): "There 
is a work of art a," with the corresponding negative: "There 
is not a work of art a" 
I t  seems to be a trifle, for the definition of art as intuition 
seemed to be neither more nor less than a trifle, but it has 
on the contrary been since seen how many things it included 
in itself, how many affirmations and how many negations: 
so many that, althougl~ I have proceeded and proceed in a 
condensed manner, I have not been able and will not be able 
to afford more than brief mention of them. That proposition 
or judgment of the criticism of art, "The work of art a is," 
implies, above all, like every judgment, a subject (the intui- 
tion of the work of art a) to conquer which is needed the 
labour of exegesis and of fantastic reproduction, together 
with the discernment of taste: we have already seen how 
difEcult and complicated this is, and how many go astray in 
it, through lack of fancy, or owing to slightness and super- 
ficiality of culture. And it further implies, like every judg- 
ment, a predicate, a category, and in this case the category 
of art, which must be conceived in the judgment, and which 
therefore becomes the concept of art. And we have aIso 
seen, as regards the concept of art, to what difEcuIties and 
complications it gives rise, and how it is a possession always 
unstable, continually attacked and ambushed, and continu- 
ally to be defended against assaults and ambushes. Criticism 
of art, therefore, develops and grows, declines and reap- 
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pears, with the development, the decadence, and the reap- 
pearance of the philosophy of art; and each can compare 
what it was in the Middle Ages (when it may almost be said 
that it was not) with what it became in the first half of the 
nineteenth century with Herder, with Hegel, and with the 
Romantics, in Italy with De Sanctis; and in a narrower field, 
what it was with De Sanctis, and what it became in the fol- 
lowing period of naturalism, in which the concept of art be- 
came clouded and finally confused with physic and with 
physiology, and even with pathology. And if disagreements 
as to judgments depend for one half, or less than half, upon 
lack of clearness as to what the artist has done, lack of sym- 
pathy and taste for another half, or more than half, this 
arises from the small clearness of ideas upon art; whence it 
often happens that two individuals are substantially at one 
as to the value of a work of art, save that the one approves 
what the other blames, because each refers to a different 
definition of art. 
And owing to this dependence of criticism upon the con- 
cept of art, as many forms of false criticism are to be distin- 
guished as there are false philosophies of art; and, limiting 
ourselves to the principal forms of which we have already 
discoursed, there is a kind of criticism which, instead of re- 
producing and characterising art, breaks in pieces and clas- 
sifies it; there is another, moralistic, which treats works of 
art like actions in respect of ends which the artist proposes 
or should have proposed to himself; there is hedonistic criti- 
cism, which presents art as having attained or failed to at- 
tain to pleasure and amusement; there is also the intellectu- 
alistic form, which measures progress according to the prog- 
ress of philosophy, knows the philosophy but not the pas- 
sion of Dante, judges Ariosto feeble because he has a feeble 
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philosophy, Tasso more serious because his philosophy is 
more serious, Leopardi contradictory in his pessimism. 
There is that criticism usually called psychological, which 
separates content from form, and instead of attending to 
works of art, attends to the psychology of the artists as men; 
and there is the other form, which separates form from con- 
tent and is pleased with abstract forms because, according 
to cases and to individual sympathies, they recall antiquity 
or the Middle Ages; and there is yet another, which finds 
beauty where it 6nds rhetorical ornaments; and finally there 
is that which, having fixed the Iaws of the kinds and of the 
arts, receives or rejects works of art according as they ap- 
proach or retreat from the models which they have formed. 
I have not enumerated them all, nor had I the intention of 
so doing, nor do I wish to expound the criticism of criticism, 
which could be nothing but a repetition of the already traced 
criticism and dialectic of Zsthetic; and already here and 
there will have been observed the beginnings of inevitable 
repetition. I t  would be more profitable to summarise (if 
even a rapid summary did not demand too much space) the 
history of criticism, to place the historical names in the ideal 
positions that I have indicated, and to shew how criticism of 
models raged above all during the Italian and French clas- 
sical periods, conceptualistic criticism in German philosophy 
of the nineteenth century, that of moralistic description at 
the period of religious reform or of the Italian national re- 
vival, psychology in France with Sainte-Beuve and many 
others; how the hedonistic form had its widest diffusion 
among people in society, among boudoir and journalistic 
critics; that of classifications, in schools, where the duty of 
criticism is believed to have been successfully fulfilled when 
the so-called origin of metres and literary and artistic kinds 
and their representatives has been investigated. 
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But the forms which I have briefly described are forms of 
criticism, however erroneous; though this cannot, in truth, 
be said of other forms which raise their banners and combat 
among themselves, under the names of '"aesthetic criticism" 
and 'Iistorical criticism." These I beg leave to baptise, on 
the contrary, as they deserve, pseudo-zsthetic criticism (or 
~sthetistic), and pseudo-historical criticism (or historisti- 
cal). These two forms, though very much opposed, have a 
common hatred of philosophy in general, and of the concept 
of art in particular: against any intervention of thought in 
the criticism of art, which in the opinion of the former is the 
affair of artistic souls; in the opinion of the latter, of the eru- 
dite. In other words, they debase criticism below criticism, 
the former limiting it to pure taste and enjoyment of art, 
the latter to pure exegetical research or preparation of ma- 
terials for reproduction by the fancy. What asthetic, which 
implies thought and concept of art, can have to do with pure 
taste without concept is difficult to say; and what histoiy can 
have to do with disconnected erudition relative to art, which 
is not organisable as history because without a concept of 
art and ignorant of what art is whereas history demands al- 
ways that we should know that of which we narrate the his- 
tory), is yet more difficult to establish; at the most we could 
note the reasons for the strange "fortune" which those two 
words have experienced. But there would be no harm in 
those names or in the refusal to exercise criticism, provided 
that the upholders of both should remain within the bound- 
aries assigned by themselves, these enjoying works of art, 
those collecting material for exegesis; and they might leave 
criticism to him who should wish to criticise, or satisfy them- 
selves with speaking ill of it without touching problems 
which properly belong to criticism. In order to attain to such 
an attitude or reserve it wodd be necessary neither more nor 
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less than that the aesthetes should never open their mouths 
in ecstasy about art, that they should silently degustate their 
joys, and, at the most, that when they met their like they 
should understand one another, as animals are said to do 
(who knows, though, if it be true!) without speaking: their 
countenance unconsciously bearing an expression of ravish- 
ment, their arms outstretched in an attitude of wonder, or 
their hands joined in a prayer of thanksgiving for the joy ex- 
perienced, should suffice for everything. Historians, for their 
part, might certainly speak: speak of codices, of corrections, 
of chronical and of topical dates, of political facts, of bio- 
graphical occurrences, of sources of works, of language, of 
syntaxes, of metres, but never of art, which they serve, but 
to whose countenance, as simple crudites, they cannot raise 
their eyes, as the maid-servant does not raise them to look 
upon her mistress, whose clothes she nevertheless brushes 
and whose food she prepares: sic uos, non uobis, But go and 
ask of men such abstentions, sacr%ces, and heroisms, how- 
ever extravagant in their ideas and fanatic in their extrava- 
gances! In particular, go and ask those who, for one or an- 
other reason, are occupied with art all their lives, not to talk 
of or to judge art! But the mute zesthetisticians talk of, 
judge, and argue about art, and the inconcIusive histori- 
cians do the same; and since in thus talking they are without 
the guide of philosophy and of the concept of art, which 
they despise and abhor, and yet have need of a concept,- 
when good sense does not fortunately happen to suggest the 
right one to them, without their being aware of it,-they 
wander among all the various preconceptions, moralistic and 
hedonistic, intellectualistic and contentistic, formalistic and 
rhetorical, physiological and academical, which I have re- 
corded, now relying upon this one, now upon that, now con- 
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founding them all and contaminating one with the other. 
And the most curious spectacle (though to be foreseen by 
the philosopher) is that the zesthetisticians and historicians, 
those irreconcilable adversaries, although they start from 
opposite points, yet agree so well that they end by uttering 
the same fatuities; and nothing is more amusing than to 
meet again the most musty intellectualistic and moralistic 
ideas in the pages of deeply moved lovers of art (so deeply 
moved as to hate thought), and in the most positive histori- 
ans (so positive as to fear compromising their positivity by 
attempting to understand the object of their researches, 
which chances this time to be called art). 
True criticism of art is certainly ~s the t i c  riticism, but not 
because it disdains philosophy, like pseudo-zesthetic, but be- 
cause it acts as philosophy and as conception of art; it is 
historical miticism, not because, like pseudo-history, it deals 
with the extrinsic of art, but because, after having availed 
itself of historical data for fantastic reproduction (and till 
then it is not yet history), when fantastic reproduction has 
been obtained, it becomes history, by determining what is 
that fact which has been reproduced in the fancy, and so 
characterising the fact by means of the concept, and estab- 
lishing what exactly is the fact that has occurred. Thus, the 
two things at variance in spheres inferior to criticism coin- 
cide in criticism; and "historical criticism of art" and "zsthet- 
ic criticism" are the same: it is indifferent which word we 
use, for each may have its special use solely for reasons of 
convenience, as when, for instance, it is desired to call spe- 
cial attention, with the first, to the necessity of the under- 
standing of art; with the second, to the historical objectivity 
of is consideration. Thus the problem discussed by certain 
methodologists is solved, namely, whether history enter into 
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the criticism of art as means or as end: since it is henceforth 
clear that history adopted as a means is not history, precisely 
because it is a means, but is exegetic material; and that 
which enters it as end is certainly history, though it does not 
enter it as a particular element, but as its constituent whole: 
which precisely describes the word "end." 
But if criticism of art be historical criticism, it follows that 
it will not be possible to limit the duty of discerning the 
beautiful and the ugly to simple approval and refusal in the 
immediate consciousness of the artist when he produces, or 
of the man of taste when he contemplates; it must widen 
and elevate itself to what is called explanation. And since in 
the world of history (which is, indeed, the only world) nega- 
tive or privative facts do not exist, what seems to taste to be 
ugly and repugnant, because not artistic, will be neither 
ugly nor repugnant to historical consideration, because it 
knows that what is not artistic yet is something eke, and has 
its right to existence as truly as it has existed. The virtuous 
Catholic allegory composed by Tasso for his "Gerusalemme" 
is not artistic, nor the patriotic declamation of Niccolini and 
Guerrazzi, nor the subtleties and conceits which Petrarch in- 
troduced into his poems; but Tasso's allegory is one of the 
manifestations of the work of the Catholic counter-reform 
in the Latin countries; the declamations of Niccolini and of 
Guerrazzi were violent attempts to rouse the souls of Italians 
against the priest and the stranger, representing adhesion to 
the manner of that arousing; the subtleties and conceits of 
Petrarch, the cult of traditional troubadour elegance, revived 
and enriched in the new Italian civilisation; that is to say, 
they are all practical facts, very significant historically and 
worthy of respect. We can well continue to talk of the beau- 
tiful and of the ugly, in the field of historical criticism, 
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through vivacity of language, or in order to chime with cur- 
rent parlance; provided that we shew at the same time, or 
hint, or let be understood, or at least do not exclude, the 
positive content, both of that beautiful and of that ugly, 
which will never be so radically condemned in its ugliness 
as when it is fully justified and understood, because in this 
case it will be removed in the most radical manner from the 
sphere proper to art. 
For this reason, criticism of art, when truly zesthetic or 
historical, becomes at the same time amplified into a criti- 
cism of life, since it is not possible to judge-that is, to char- 
acterise-works of art without at the same time judging and 
charactensing the works of the whole life: as we observe 
with the truly great critics, and above all with De Sanctis, 
in his "History of Italian Literature" and in his "Critical Es- 
says," who is as profound a critic of art as of philosophy, mo- 
rality, and politics; he is profound in the one because pro- 
found in the other, and inversely: the strength of his pure 
zsthetic consideration of art is the strength of his pure moral 
consideration of morality. Because the forms of the spirit, of 
which criticism avails itself as categories of judgment, al- 
though ideally distinguishable in unity, are not materially 
separable from one another and from unity, under penalty 
of seeing them vanish before us. We cannot, therefore, speak 
of a distinction of art from other criticism, save in an empiri- 
cal manner, to indicate that the attention of the speaker or 
writer is directed to one rather than to another part of his 
indivisible argument. And the distinction is also empirical 
(I have hitherto preserved this here, in order to proceed 
with didactic clearness) bettven criticimn and history of 
art: a distinction which has been specially determined by 
the fact that a polemical element prevails in the study of 
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contemporary art and literature, which causes it to be more 
readily called "criticism," while in that of the art and litera- 
ture of a more remote period prevails the narrative tone, 
and therefore it is more readily termed "history." In reality, 
true and complete criticism is the serene historical narration 
of what has happened; and history is the only true criticism 
that can be exercised upon the doings of humanity, which 
cannot be not-facts, since they have happened, and are not 
to be dominated by the spirit otherwise than by understand- 
ing them. And since the criticism of art has shewn itself in- 
separable from other criticism, so the history of art can be 
separated from the complete history of human civilisation 
only for reasons of a literaly nature, among which it certain- 
ly follows its own law, which is art, but from which it re- 
ceives the historical movement, which belongs to the spirit 
as a whole, never to one form of the spirit separated from 
the others. 
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